

zones in hours or, at most, in several days. Few if any of the proposals offer any type of real guarantee against surprise attack although most do offer an extension of warning time and a reduction in the chance of genuine surprise. Any confidence created on this basis alone must necessarily be limited. Realizing this fact imposes some limit on the more general degree of confidence that can be generated in the "possibly" benign intentions of adversaries. In short, most Constraint Measures do not (and cannot) constrain dangerous or worrisome forces sufficiently to demonstrate (through their mutual acceptance) anything conclusive about benign intentions nor can they eliminate, on their own, concern about surprise attack.

On a more pragmatic level, the identification of capabilities and activities that represent genuine, unambiguous offensive-only threats may not be as simple and straightforward as it is sometimes assumed. There is great functional ambiguity associated with increasingly complex and sophisticated modern military forces. This makes the selective separation and restriction of threatening offensive components difficult to achieve. Those capabilities that pose particularly "offensive" threats such as modern main battle tanks and mechanized infantry also represent extremely potent defensive capabilities. How does one devise Constraint Measures that constrain only their offensive character? Great care must also be taken to avoid actually handicapping legitimate and necessary defensive capabilities, something which can happen with simple plans to create, for instance, demilitarized zones adjacent to border areas. In this case, offensively employed forces would have a clear advantage due to the relatively longer time necessary to adequately prepare defensive positions. A great deal of thought will have to attend the construction of proposals and their final negotiation *if unintended consequences are to be avoided.*

A particularly important consideration in devising effective Constraint Measures will have to be an awareness of the very different and evolving military doctrines of the participant states as well as their unique security concerns (or, more important, their unique perceptions of security concerns). Western proposals will have to take into account the fact that the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, its allies,

have a genuinely different perspective on national security than do various Western countries. Denying this – or failing to recognize and understand it – will doom effective negotiations and may result in dangerously inadequate proposals and/or disillusionment with the whole process of Confidence Building.

#### *Declaratory CBMs*

Declaratory Measures are not closely related to the Confidence-Building Measures discussed in this study. Practically, however, they are considered to be CBMs by many states, particularly the Soviet Union and its East European allies. In principle, Declaratory Measures are either unilateral declarations or multilateral agreements (up to and including formal treaties) to defer certain actions. The explicit promise or agreement *not* to do something is seen by some to constitute a legitimate approach to Confidence-Building. In some sense, this may be true. From a very instrumental perspective, if the leaders of some states feel more trustful or confident as a result of such declarations, *then the "declarations" have performed the function of a Confidence-Building Measure.* Typical declaratory proposals include "No First (Nuclear) Use," "No Early First (Nuclear) Use," "No Nuclear Use against Non-Nuclear States," "No First Use of Force," and "No First (Chemical Warfare) Use."

The biggest difficulty with Declaratory Measures is that they entail only a promise not to do something fearful. They do not (and, very often, logically cannot) include even a marginal substantive measure to reduce or constrain the capabilities that underly the declaration. The discovery, for instance, that "No First Use" is a false declaration can only come in one catastrophic moment. There can be no realistic demonstration that all are "abiding" by a "No First Use" declaration other than actual absence of first use. This could certainly be seen to be a very narrow – even perverse – understanding of Confidence Building.

The argument that basic declarations of good will and non-aggressive intent help to create better political relations between hostile states and, hence, pave the way for more substantive Constraint Measures has some merit. This is probably true when relations between states are already moderately good. However, the counter-argument – that these types of declara-

