

composition of the group proposed by Colonel Greene and Adoula to undertake the training programme did not make U Thant's position any easier, consisting as it did exclusively of NATO countries plus Israel. In itself, this would not necessarily be an insurmountable obstacle, in view of the obvious difficulty of obtaining competent instructors from any other group. When to this was added the preponderant role of the Belgians, however, bitter opposition could be anticipated within the United Nations on the grounds that the Organization had not spent \$400 million and sacrificed many lives, including that of a Secretary-General, in order to bring the Belgians back. Experience of the Belgians in the Congo during the period of the United Nations effort there had convinced Narasimhan that, however, much Spaak might wish to co-operate in a genuinely United Nations oriented programme, the individual Belgians who would carry it out would find it impossible to shake off their former attitudes and aspirations. These objections would not apply in relation to any of the other countries named to take on training duties; there was no opposition, for example, on the ground of NATO membership. Narasimhan made it clear that he personally did not see the problem in terms of the nature or degree of authority vested in a United Nations co-ordinating staff. So far as he was concerned, given the contemplated role of the Belgian contingent, such authority could not be effectively exercised and any attempt to control the operation would simply result in a continual conflict of interests.

2. At the same time Narasimhan recognized that there might well be no one else who could undertake the job, and that the Americans were deeply committed to getting on with it in what seemed the most practical fashion as soon as possible. This had, in fact, been embarrassing for the Secretariat since the Americans had throughout shown a tendency to jump the gun. For example, the Greene, Cleveland and Truman missions and other similar initiatives had been undertaken without any prior consultation. He also recognized the desirability from the American viewpoint of a United Nations umbrella. In the circumstances, however, any umbrella which could be provided might well be both ineffective as a genuine instrument of United Nations policy and politically disastrous insofar as it implied United Nations sponsorship of a revival of Belgian influence.

3. The United Nations had probably over-reached itself in the Congo and in the process had tarnished the Organization's prestige. It had been lucky, however, in that the operation had ended as of now on a note of success. The Secretary-General might therefore be well advised to disengage while the record was relatively clean. The Belgians on their own could do the job, in all probability much more expeditiously than they could under any United Nations programme. This in turn might well enable ONUC to withdraw its forces more rapidly than had been anticipated, perhaps in a matter of months. Given the financial problem, this would be all to the good. Narasimhan also admitted, however, that on the financial side, washing his hands of the training programme in circumstances which opened the way to revived Belgian domination might create additional difficulties for the Secretary-General in connection with the effort to persuade the Soviet Union and others to honour their obligations with respect to the Congo operation.

4. Although Narasimhan was aware of the risks involved, he did not think that a large Belgian training mission would lead to a new "Katanga" situation. On the contrary he thought the Belgians would in fact find themselves responsible for seeing that such a situation did not arise.