authority from the United Nations. We considered this to be no academic matter, but to be a very important principle and one which should be established in a way which would be not only satisfactory for the present but a valuable precedent for the future. This was done when the Security Council passed an additional resolution on July 7 establishing a unified command and requesting the United States to designate a commander of such United Nations forces as might be made available. We welcomed this resolution because it established the United Nations character of the operations in Korea without limiting unduly the military authority which any commander must have if he is to be successful.

After that resolution was passed, the three Canadian destroyers, which by that time had reached Pearl Harbor, were made available on July 12 to the United Nations Unified Command for the restoration of peace in Korea. Then on July 14 came a request, not from the Security Council this time but from the Secretary-General of the United Nations, for further assistance; and on July 19, a few days afterwards, the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) announced that a long-range R.C.A.F. squadron would be provided at once for service in the Pacific air-lift. This kind of air assistance, and not the provision of fighter aircraft, was, we were told then by those concernéd with operations, what was required at that time.

Then on August 7, after further discussions not only in Ottawa but also in Washington and Lake Success, and after I had made visits to both those places and talked with both the United States Secretary of State and the United Nations Secretary-General, it was announced that a decision had been taken by the government to raise an additional brigade, to be known as the Canadian special force which would be available—subject, of course, to parliamentary approval—for service in Korea as part of the United Nations forces there if it could be most effectively used in that way when it was ready for service; and I can assure the House—and my colleague, the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Claxton) can do so with more authority than can I—that this brigade is being made ready with the greatest possible speed.

It is the proposed use of this force in the way I have suggested which is one of the reasons why we are meeting here today, to carry out, by parliamentary action, the pledge which the Prime Minister gave this house on June 30 last.

Under the authority of the United Nations the chief responsibility, outside that of South Korea itself, for repelling the North Korean forces has been shouldered by the United States. It is, of course, natural that this should be so. Alone among the anti-communist countries the United States had stationed in the Far East substantial forces which were available for use in Korea when the trouble began. In addition they had, of course, special obligations for peace and security in that area arising from their position as the power responsible for the occupation of Japan.

I think it should also be remembered that ordinarily it is only great powers such as the United States or the United Kingdom which possess ground forces in being which can be moved rapidly to distant theatres without imperilling the security of their homelands or of other areas in which they may have urgent commitments, such as the commitments of the French in Indo-China and of the British in Malaya and Hong Kong.