

overall direction and management of defence and security policy, operations and resources, then the answer might be to create this new entity.¹⁸

The Operational Aspect

The next generation defence and security structure must direct most of the traditional things foreign affairs departments, ministries of defence, and departments of security have directed over many decades. They are now also involved in sundry other exercises and areas that once fell to civil departments or, most often, to no clearly defined authority at all. Whether we identify these activities as OOTW, or peace-building, or "defence diplomacy," to recall but a few current labels, it is evident that these types of operations do not fall nicely into traditional departments. Now when the Canadian Forces deploys overseas, soldiers are as likely as not to be joined by diplomats, public servants, civilians, the media, and NGOs, large and small. Yet Canadian public administration has not fully acknowledged the consequences of this important change. Perhaps what is needed is a new operational concept to move Canada into the future world of international interventions.

It is not new to suggest that when units of the Canadian Forces are deployed abroad, their activities ought to be coordinated with Canadian diplomats in that region. Sometimes such cooperation is effective, but sometimes it is not.¹⁹ This oversight might not be too egregious in routine operations in established coalitions or multinational missions. It might, however, be significant in other, more dangerous, and more important cases. Besides, as other elements of the government, including the RCMP and Canadian-sponsored NGOs, join Canadian Forces units in the field, national coordination may be increasingly important and appropriate. But the chief reason why Canadian diplomats and military officers ought to improve coordination in the field is because national interests expressed in a coherent national policy require the careful matching of foreign policy goals to military action not just in Ottawa but, arguable, more critically in-theatre.

If one were to begin from the proposition that Canada had a coherent, coordinated national policy for acting through coalitions and that it would be expressed abroad in multinational operations which included various Canadian soft and hard assets, then it seems appropriate that some coordinating mechanism should direct these elements towards national goals. Joining ends to means, in other words, requires more than simply building physical instruments appropriate to national goals. It must mean, also, the continuous coordination of ends and means in the field. This objective cannot be met from Ottawa, no matter the marvels of modern telecommunications.

It might be useful to begin the planning process not at its usual starting point, with formed military units and government resources, but by looking at each mission as a singular event. That is to say, by designing missions built to need and by drawing on a wide range of Canadian resources,

¹⁸. Ibid., pp. 43-44.

¹⁹. During an interview with a Canadian scholar who recently returned from a research period in the former Yugoslavia it was alleged that commanders of Canadian Forces units in the theatre had barely spoken with Canadian diplomats, let alone coordinated their reactions to events in the region.