

have behind them only moral force and the weight of world opinion.

These dangers become more acute as United Nations activities tend to revolve around the policies of the two blocs now forming inside it, each headed by a super power and around each of which lesser powers find themselves, sometimes uneasily, clustering. Pressure, on the one hand, friendly and almost unconscious, on the other, undisguised and ruthless, is sometimes exerted on the smaller members of the United Nations to identify their own policies with one or other of the group leaders. It is becoming too difficult to avoid this, as the feeling develops "you must either be for or against us, when we are so right and so strong, and the other fellow is so wrong and so strong." It is increasingly hard for countries, especially those which have become known as middle powers, to maintain a position of independence and objectivity in the United Nations in the face of this growing division between the Great Powers. It becomes hard to reach a collective decision, based on reason and argument, compromise and conciliation. The trial is one of strength, not of right.

**DIFFERENCES OF TWO GROUPS**

There are, of course, many and fundamental points of difference between these two groups, the Totalitarian and the Democratic groups; between their policies and tactics and above all, their ideals. There is also a difference between their degrees of solidarity. The Slav group always -- or practically always, except when one member is dozing and doesn't get the signal -- votes as a unit. They really are a block. The Western democratic group, composed of free states, underlines and may occasionally risk that freedom by the very frequent division of its voting strength. Voting chips often fall off that block. It may be, of course, that one group votes always as a unit because it is always right, but this explanation is, to say the least, unconvincing. It may also be that other states vary their support for each other because they are confused or, on the other hand, because the need for voting solidarity is not so great. This also is an inadequate explanation. The fact is that certain states -- democratic states in the progressive and not the reactionary sense of the word -- try to vote as they think right on any given issue, a process which is not always as easy as it should be; made even less easy by the fact that our divisions are gleefully exploited by those who vote to order.

In the face of misrepresentation of motive and distortion of result it becomes tempting not merely to vote with your friends, but to vote against those who will not be your friends. Any other course, you fear, may leave you open to the charge of weakness, of giving aid and comfort to the opposition. This, no doubt, works both ways, with a depressing and dividing result. As the former Secretary of State, James Byrnes, once said:

I sometimes think our Soviet friends fear we would think them weak and soft if they agreed without a struggle on anything we wanted, even though they wanted it too.

**MEASURE OF DETERIORATION**

One result of this suspicion between the two strongest powers is a growing tendency to appoint to United Nations political Commissions of investigation and enquiry, middle and small powers only. This is, in a sense, a measure of the deterioration that has developed in relations between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., because it is, I suppose, a confession that, in political agencies set up by the United Nations, the chances of common agreement are decreased by the membership on them of these two powers. Additional responsibility is, therefore, thrown on smaller states. This creates a situation of some difficulty and, at times, embarrassment, especially for countries like Canada. In the case of very small powers, they are protected to some extent by their very smallness from the consequences of the decisions which they take. The great powers, of course, have always their own protection through the veto, but a middle power, like Canada, can, as two wars and many conferences have shown, make an important contribution to the achievement of victory in war or of a diplomatic decision in peace. This makes its support for policies advanced by others of real value. We in Canada are beginning to realize that our new position of middle power, which we have been rather inclined to boast about, is not without its disadvantages. Being in the middle is not always a comfortable place.

Smaller powers, should not be asked to undertake United Nations duties which their more powerful associates find to be irksome, dangerous or embarrassing. They should not be asked to play roles in the international drama which should be performed by the stars. There are times when, if it is impossible for the stars to act together, a particular play should not be staged at all.

**JOBS WITHOUT POWER**

Furthermore, the United Nations, while giving smaller powers more jobs to do, is not giving them the power to do them. There have been several examples of this in recent United Nations history, and they all point to the necessity of taking collective responsibility for, and putting collective force behind, decisions which have been taken collectively. A good illustration of this essential need is the action of the recent United Nations Assembly in relation to Palestine.

There is another point. When disputes reach the Security Council, not enough use seems to be made there of procedures for private and informal discussion and agreement. There is a tendency to rush at once into angry and unproductive public debate during which positive statements are made and firm positions taken.

This makes conciliation and compromise difficult; the stand previously taken has become a headline in the world's press and there is nothing so difficult for a government to abandon as a head-line. I am a great believer in frank and open diplomacy, in open covenants, openly announced, but often quietly and confidentially reached. There is more to diplomacy than an irresistible desire to talk to the press "at the drop of a hint". This, however, is by way of digression.

**RIGHT TO REPEL ATTACK**

Does all this mean that we should give up the United Nations as a too difficult, if not too good a job? Not at all. That would be suicidal as well as cowardly. The weaknesses that have been displayed, the difficulties that have been encountered, together with the deterioration in the world situation, mean that we should work harder, far harder than we have before, to build up our international organization into an effective instrument for the preservation of peace with enough force behind it, to back up decisions which it has freely taken against their violation by others, even by its own members. That is the obligation - of acceptance and enforcement - which members undertook when they signed the Charter. But the force necessary to carry out these decisions, must be brought under some form of international control.

The inalienable right of a nation to repel as best it can an unprovoked attack, must remain. Even the most law-abiding citizen in the most effectively policed city has that. If some one jumps on him out of a dark alley, he can do his best to fight back. He doesn't wait until the neighbours or a policeman appear. But with this exception, the United Nations must, if it is to be effective, have adequate force under its sole control, to implement its decisions. This force, which would consist largely of forces of the member states, must be capable of being brought into action quickly as a result of an international decision which cannot be blocked by any one power.

You will of course complain that this is impractical and impossible. My reply is that at the moment it certainly is but that it is an objective which must be reached; a purpose that must be realized. The alternative is international anarchy in an age of guided missiles, guided bacteria and guided hatreds. The so-called realist who can get any comfort out of that alternative is my idea of an optimist. He is also my idea of a man burying his head in the sand.

It is also idle to complain that surrender of absolute control over national forces means an infringement of national sovereignty. Of course it does, but every nation, even the permanent members of the Council with their veto, when they signed the Charter gave up some part of their national sovereignty in the interests of a greater security. If they are

going to benefit from that surrender, they must be able to implement collective decisions by collective police action, which alone can guarantee collective security. There is no other way. Peace never has been, and I venture to suggest never can be, preserved on any other basis. This does not mean disarmament. It means, not the abolition of the truncheon, but putting it in the hands of a policeman, rather than a prowler.

I am, I hope, realistic enough to know that the process of putting enough power in the hands of the United Nations to overawe and keep in check any nation that may harbour aggressive intentions, is going to be a long, tough one. I know also that as long as the power of veto exists and is used, the international policeman would, to say the least, have some difficulty in getting a decision to use his truncheon, even if he has it, except possibly against urchins stealing apples. The experience, so far, in Palestine, shows that he may be timid in using it even in cases where only little fellows are involved.

**DISTRUST THE BASIC DANGER**

The basic difficulty and danger is, then, distrust and suspicion between the Great Powers. Should we not, however, in the face of that distrust, indeed possibly because of it, look to our international organization and see how we can strengthen it?

There is no doubt that organic strengthening is impossible as long as the veto exists and can be used, as it has been used, without effective limitation. It does stand in the way of genuine collective security organized and made effective through the United Nations as it exists today. I know that a formal attempt to abolish that veto at this time, would mean the quick break-up of the organization. Nevertheless, just as something has been done, much more can be done to limit the effect of the veto, and thereby make the United Nations stronger without driving any state out of the United Nations unless it is looking for any excuse to get out.

There is the limitation that can be imposed by custom and convention. That has already determined, for instance, that mere abstention from voting does not necessarily bring the veto into effect. Furthermore, permanent members of the Council who are willing to do so can impose on themselves self-denying ordinances - as indeed some have done - not to use their veto in whole categories of questions which come before the Council. This may have some effect on the others.

What do we do, however, if disunity and suspicion between the Great Powers causes the veto power to be used irresponsibly and selfishly and if any limitation of that power, by custom or by an amendment of the Charter, is impossible? What do we do then to build up an international agency capable of keeping the peace, because it will have sufficient power, under international control, without the veto,