

Lesson No. 7: The synergistic effect of multimethod verification measures incorporating interlocking responsibilities can provide the necessary impetus for more far-reaching arms limitation and verification arrangements.

By its very design, the multimethod verification enterprise in the Sinai created mutually reinforcing interlocking responsibilities among the parties, the UNEF and the US, which strengthened the viability of the disengagement process as it evolved — success was built upon success. In addition, the synergistic integration of individual verification components in the form of unattended ground sensors with on-site and aerial inspections, contributed to the creation of a verification system whose basic elements could be applied directly or with some modification to subsequent agreements. For example, in the Peace Treaty negotiations of 1979, American, Egyptian and Israeli officials did not have to search for new verification procedures since precedent had already established the basic parameters of a verification system appropriate to this particular setting. Knowing which verification procedures worked well in the past facilitated negotiations and enhanced the prospects for a mutually satisfactory outcome.

Lesson No. 8: Parties are better able to manage the risks of agreement when evidence of compliance is unambiguous.

The process of verifying compliance with the Sinai II Agreement and the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty was particularly thorough. The parties could operate confidently within the constraints imposed by the agreements knowing that the military activities of both sides were being monitored carefully by national liaison officers, UN observers, US civilian personnel and US overflights.

The success of any verification system depends to a large extent on the ability to report on and deal with apparent violations in an accurate and timely fashion to minimize mis-

trust and suspicion. In the case of Sinai II and the Peace Treaty, a number of procedures were used to ensure reliable confirmation of compliance. First, reports from on-site inspections were triple-checked, taking into account the independent assessments of each member of the three-person inspection teams. Second, the SFM Operations Unit issued its findings expeditiously with reports produced in a standardized format to ensure a common baseline of comparison for all parties. This method of reporting was especially important for Egypt and Israel domestically since it enabled both sides to satisfy internal objections regarding entering into an agreement with a long-time enemy. Finally, through the Joint Commission established under Sinai II (later to become the Liaison System under the Peace Treaty), the parties had at their disposal a mechanism for resolving any ambiguous situations that arose.

Having clear evidence of any breach of an agreement — particularly evidence secured by trusted third parties and broadly accepted by the international community — may serve to protect a nation against domestic and international criticism if the other party fails to perform. Such clear-cut evidence, in both its military and political aspects, is especially important in order to insulate the peace-building process from those actors who have a strong investment in the demise of new agreements to which they are not a party.

