

"helped us realize ... that most of the crucial problems before the world are not ... aspects of a struggle against communism. It helped us to face these crucial problems: colonialism and its aftermath, racial discrimination, cultural imperialism, the misery of half the people of the world." Escott Reid thought more deeply and more sensitively about these and other international issues than most of his contemporaries. His memoir of thought and action deserves to be read with appreciation and respect.

— Robert Malcolmson

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The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon

Robert Jervis

Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989, 266 pp., US\$ 21.95 cloth

■ One might well ask, with the democratic revolution now sweeping across Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, whether the United States did not overspend on a threat that was not nearly as great as some imagined. The implication behind Robert Jervis' new book is that the nuclear strategy developed to address that "threat" was just as flawed in both design and logic. Jervis is the dean of American security studies and well known for his earlier writings on nuclear strategy, crisis management and the psychology of decision making. His new book is unquestionably the most comprehensive and thorough critique of US nuclear policy available.

Jervis argues that US and Soviet nuclear strategies have been masked in a bundle of contradictions: on the one hand, the political leadership of the two superpowers has long since recognized that nuclear war is both unwinnable and unthinkable; on the other hand, they have encouraged a buildup of their respective nuclear arsenals and the pursuit of nuclear strategies which are based on the premise that victory in nu-

clear war is possible. He ridicules current notions about "countervailing" or "prevailing" responses, escalation dominance and control, or deterrence by denial.

At the same time he urges a return to what he refers to as the "major old, good ideas," namely, that nuclear weapons are not ordinary weapons, that the nuclear revolution has rendered the possibility of military victory obsolete, and that crisis stability is both a necessary and desirable objective of all strategy and policy.

Jervis also suggests that scholars and students of nuclear strategy have contributed a number of important "new, good ideas" to the strategic debate. These include the insight that any attempt by one side to "improve" its own security will only make its adversary feel more vulnerable (now referred to as the "security dilemma") and lead to a costly arms race, that arms control should concentrate on the characteristics of weapons not their numbers, and that it is difficult in practice to distinguish between a first-strike and a so-called "second-strike" weapon. Jervis also suggests that a growing appreciation of the security dilemma has facilitated possibilities for security cooperation between the superpowers and led to the development of common principles, norms, and rules of conflict management.

In other chapters, Jervis addresses such issues as the relationship between morality and nuclear strategy, the different meanings and policy understandings of MAD, and the psychological aspects of crisis stability. The book also includes a brilliant chapter on the symbolic nature of nuclear politics, his analysis of which yields five important conclusions:

many strategic policies create their own difficulties; there are opportunities for avoiding such pitfalls; a good deal of strategic planning operates autonomously on the basis of self-defined problems; many of the possibilities for and against arms control must be seen in psychological, not military terms; beliefs about whether war is inevitable are especially important in determining whether peace will be maintained.

Much of Jervis' analysis is at the level of strategic theory and psychology. Yet one is forced to ask whether, if US and Soviet nuclear policies have been so flawed, the root of the problem lies at this level (the level of ideas or strategic logic), at the level of institutions, or somewhere else. Unfortunately Jervis does not address this issue. Instead, he prefers to level his critique at the mind-numbing debates of nuclear theologians.

Although the implication of Jervis' argument is that fewer is better when it comes to nuclear weapons — what some call "existential deterrence" — his book is bereft of ideas about how this is to be achieved and how nuclear forces and strategies of the two superpowers should be changed to accommodate new political realities in the East-West relationship. Let us hope that Jervis will turn his formidable powers of analysis to these questions in his next book. — Fen Osler Hampson

Mr. Hampson teaches international affairs at Carleton University and is a research associate at the Institute.

BRIEFLY NOTED

The Defence Industrial Base and the West

David G. Haglund, editor

London: Routledge, 1989, 288 pp., \$69.00 cloth

■ With a multi-national list of contributors this volume draws on recent cases of complex weapon systems development to show, first, the kinds of opportunities and challenges presented by multi-state participation in weapon development and second, the major themes of the debate "over the degree to which the goal of maintenance of the defence industrial base conditions and sometimes conflicts with other objectives of states." Among the chapters are: "The MRCA/Tornado: The Politics and Economics of Collaborative Procurement"; "The Swedish Defence Industrial Base: Implications for the Economy"; and "Israel and the Lavi Fighter-Aircraft."

Canadian Oceans Policy: National Strategies and the New Law of the Sea

Donald McRae and Gordon Munro, editors

Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1989, 282 pp., \$39.95 cloth, \$22.95 paper

■ This book is concerned with the nature and adequacy of Canada's ocean management policies and practices in the light of the regime that emerged from the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea. The multidisciplinary perspective presented here by lawyers, political scientists, economists, fisheries scientists, and diplomats specializing in oceans matters, examines how ocean issues are managed by one of the world's most important coastal states and looks at the progressive development of an international oceans regime.

The Arctic: Choices for Peace and Security

Thomas R. Berger, Harriet Critchley, Alexei Rodionov, Mary Simon and 20 others.

Vancouver: Gordon Soules, 1989, 282 pp., \$12.95 paper

■ This volume is drawn from the speeches and debates of the public inquiry by the same name held in Edmonton, 18 and 19 March 1989. The inquiry, attended by over fifteen hundred participants, examined the Arctic as a key element of international peace and security. The issues include: the environmental effects of Arctic industrial development and resource extraction; problems of pollution from the south; militarization of the Arctic and the threat of nuclear confrontation in the Arctic; the need for the superpowers and other Arctic countries to cooperate to reduce political and military tension; and the needs and aims of the native peoples of the Arctic.

(The conference on which this volume is based received financial assistance from the Institute for Peace and Security) □

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