

inspectors immediately. The international inspectors should not be delayed because the host party claims its representatives are temporarily unavailable. Also, no bureaucratic constraints — for example, the need for approval by the host party for inspectors to travel to the location to be inspected — should be allowed to delay the inspectors. Of course, the inspections themselves should be carried out in such a way as to avoid hampering the economic and technical activities of a party and to be consistent with the safe operation of the inspected location. Many other details will have to be worked out between the Executive Council of the Consultative Committee and the party that will be inspected. For example, they will need to agree on subsidiary arrangements that specify in detail how on-site verification will be applied to each location subject to such verification.

These proposals for procedures to implement systematic international on-site verification represent what the United States believes is necessary for the successful operation of this verification regime. They are subject to further modification, elaboration, and refinement. We hope other countries will have their own ideas on this subject and will put them before the Conference on Disarmament for consideration. We look forward to developing the contents of this part of Annex II in conjunction with our colleagues in the Conference on Disarmament.

The regime of systematic international on-site verification that I have outlined today is designed to ensure that declared chemical weapons and their production facilities are destroyed and that prohibited activities do not take place at other declared locations and facilities. We believe that this regime is both comprehensive and effective, certainly as it applied to those declared locations and facilities. However, the regime I have outlined today is inadequate by itself to provide the necessary assurance of compliance required for an agreement banning chemical weapons. It must be complemented by an effective challenge inspection system. In another statement, I will examine the challenge inspection provisions that the United States believes are necessary for a comprehensive and effective ban on chemical weapons.

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My Government have considered the text of document CD/500 with great care. It is our firm view that its approach, particularly on verification, points to the direction in which we must go, if we are to find the means to assure full compliance. My delegation therefore stands ready to proceed with others along the path identified by document CD/500. Just as the United States delegation has already indicated its readiness to consider alternative approaches, we too shall be flexible; we shall try to be imaginative, where imagination is required. In our view, effective compliance can be achieved, if there exists the political will to agree to a solution guaranteeing it.

There is a broad consensus among all delegations round this table about what needs to be prohibited. But we all need to work together to develop provisions that will create confidence that all parties are fulfilling their obligations under the convention. This confidence is needed to make it possible for governments to sign and parliaments to ratify the convention, and to give it stability after its entry into force. The need for provisions to create confidence that all parties are fulfilling their obligations is increased by the nature of the chemical weapons themselves. Some of those which have actually been used in past conflicts are based on simple chemical substances, which are not difficult to make, and in some cases are made and used on a substantial scale for legitimate civil purposes, with which none of us intends, or, indeed, would wish to interfere. Even the super-toxic nerve agents can be made from fairly readily accessible materials of simple chemical structure. The practical difficulties of manufacturing them