

# Steady Work: Verification/ Peace-keeping

It is unfortunately true that arms control agreements cannot be negotiated on the basis of trust alone. The highly sophisticated nature of today's weapons means, that in order to be meaningful and durable, arms control and disarmament agreements must have provisions which ensure compliance and build confidence in the validity and integrity of a treaty. Because arms control agreements are directly related to the security of signatory nations, effective verification measures are vital.

One of the major obstacles to the successful negotiation of arms control and disarmament measures has been the inability of nations to agree on common standards and methods of verifying agreements.

Some years ago, Canada concluded that the issue of verification was central to every significant arms control negotiation and might well be a critical factor in making progress on arms control and disarmament in the 1980s.

An initial cooperative effort between External Affairs and National Defence led to the production of a trilogy of studies on verification which were subsequently tabled at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva in 1980 and 1981. The quality and detail of the work in these papers established Canada's credentials and international reputation as a country seriously involved in this complex and central issue. In 1983, a Verification Research Unit, entirely dedicated to all aspects of arms control verification, was established in the Department of External Affairs. The current budget of the unit is \$1 million.

In order to prepare the way for the negotiation of a Chemical Weapons Convention at the CD, Canada has done important pioneering work on the question of chemical weapons use. These studies include a series of examinations of possible chemical weapons use in Southeast Asia undertaken by Dr. Bruno Schiefer of the University of Saskatchewan, a compilation of interviews