

they have plenty to keep them occupied. On the other hand the officers commanding the permanent corps would be the ones on whom would devolve the duties of brigadiers, and surely a little practical experience in handling brigades once in a dog's age during peace time would not be quite useless. The permanent corps surely aim at more than being mere theoretical soldiers.

A recent paragraph in one of the English service papers states that the Adjutant General (British) has ordered that the utmost care is to be exhibited in enlisting recruits for the militia. The men selected are to have a permanent residence in the county, which will prevent the enlistment of men of the tramp class. Some strict restriction of this class would not be out of place in Canada. It is a well known fact that on going into camp the rural corps, in this district at any rate will enlist any man they can lay their hands upon, no matter where they come from. Recruiting parties from some of the frontier regiments have come into Montreal to get men to complete their complements and men from Vermont have not been refused. It is possible that these men may have lied about their place of residence, but it is an indisputable fact that Vermont men occasionally come across the lines to enjoy an outing, wear the Queen's scarlet and draw the drillpay.

That was a large and important question that Lt. Col. Lindsay brought up for discussion at the Canadian Military Institute, Toronto, a couple of weeks ago. Although there are any number of important questions to attract the attention of those interested in the welfare of the militia force the question, "How to increase the efficiency of the rural corps?" is doubtless the most important one of all. The permanent corps and the more efficient city corps are all very well in their way as the backbone of the militia force, but where is the rest of the body to come from if the rural corps are not raised out of their present state of inefficiency. The rural corps should be the very bone and sinew of the force, and they doubtless would be were they placed in a fairly advantageous position so far as organization and training are concerned. That is evidently Lt. Col. Lindsay's opinion, and the opinion of all who spoke after him, for there was not one word of a despairing character uttered. It is to be hoped that other officers of rural corps will follow Lt. Col. Lindsay's example and devote serious attention to this serious matter.

One of the most important questions brought up in Lt. Col. Lindsay's paper was that of recruiting. The present system could scarcely be worse than it is. The captain commanding a company has to bring a certain number of men into camp or he cannot draw pay. If he falls short of recruits he often goes outside of his district to get men and takes anything that looks like a man. Often it looks suspiciously like an undergrown school boy. Their characters and places of residence are, at least in some cases, not enquired into. The only object is to fill up the ranks of the company. Then, as Lt. Col. Lindsay pointed out, the principle of the captains recruiting their own companies is a wrong one. Because the men were asked to enlist by the captain they consider that they have placed him under an obligation to them by joining his company and expect him to show his gratitude by relieving them from duties and by shielding them from punishment in cases where they have made themselves amenable to harsh discipline.

Lt. Col. Lindsay's arguments in favour of calling the rural militia out for their annual training in the winter, or early spring months are well worthy of consideration. There can be no doubt that the farmers could better afford time for drill in those months than they can in the summer, and it is the farmers that the rural militia should aim to get hold of. The necessary barrack accommodation would not be so expensive as might appear at first sight, and the squad and company drill to which our training has been cut down could be as well done in barracks as in camp. It really could be better done for the men could be better in hand, they would be more comfortable, their meals would be better cooked, and considerable time would be saved. Another important fact in favor of the suggested change. There would be far less wear and tear upon arms, equipment and uniform.

There are several matters in connection with the efficiency returns (G. O. 9, Feb. 4th, 1894), which are exciting considerable curiosity in the force. How, for instance, do the 5th Dragoons manage to get 16, 17 and 18 points per troop for sword exercise out of a maximum of 10? In some districts the commanding officers of battalions are given marks; in others none. To be explicit, in districts 1 and 3 none are given; in 2, 4 and 5 they appear. In the 5th district most of the C. O.'s get more than the maximum. Possibly it includes the marks of the field officers and adjutant;

but even so, it should not exceed the maximum. As the competition was limited to company movements, it is hard to see how the field officers came to be rung in. In any case all districts should be alike in regard to this. Number three company of the 47th Battalion get 9½ marks for "answers to questions." How is this? As we have said before, if these competitions are to be of any use the conditions should be more explicit.

How in the world are we to reconcile "C" and "D" of the General Order regarding the drill of companies? Suppose you have fifty men on parade how should they fall in? "D" says they must fall in, in single rank, being less than thirty-two files. If you do this you will exceed the frontage mentioned in "C," which is the frontage of thirty-two men. If the problem is solved by falling in with thirty-two men in the front rank, how do you dispose of the balance? Do you dispose them to make a rear rank as far as they will go from one of the flanks or from both flanks, or do you form some kind of a straggling rear rank with the men left over from the front rank in rear of their own sections? It is all very vague, but a couple of subsequent General Orders will probably suffice to explain just what they do mean. By the way what is to become of the junior major in our service, the new drill having wiped him out?

Some time ago we referred to the case of a young gentleman recently arrived from England whose very laudable ambition was to get into the Canadian permanent corps. There could have been no objection to his gratifying his ambition provided he had kept it within bounds and had enlisted in the ranks like many other young fellows of good English families had done. But he wanted to be an officer, don't you know, and he was determined to become one in spite of the superior claims of all the graduates of the Royal Military College and of capable officers in the active militia who had ambitions in the same direction. He soon got hold of friends who lent him their influence, for he did not take long to find that that was what he wanted. Then he joined a militia corps and started off to take a course at a military school to learn the goose step. He has been at one school or another ever since, at the Government expense of course, and boasts that he has as good as got his appointment in his pocket. Those who recall the Minister of Militia's statement that his department had been div-