

sons, and baggage may be all crossing together. By means of a little practice a whole corps of cavalry could be taken across any ordinary stream, not fordable, in this manner in one hour.

The waggons and carts could be unloaded in ten minutes by men used to the operation. In ten minutes more, or twenty at most, twenty-one waggon boats would be disposable for flying bridges. Towed by these a thousand men could cross at a time, and take only three minutes to cross. Thus in sixty minutes from reaching the stream ten thousand men would be across. The loaded carts light enough to float are to be towed across at the same time, and the artillery can be dragged over without waiting. As the men do not get into the boats, but tow outside, the small weight of their arms will not prevent a load of ammunition from going over every trip. All working together, and the waggons made fit for boats, the whole corps can cross in a dozen trips.

I have not mentioned the carts. They might be used, but are almost too small to carry much. They, as well as the waggons, might be made capable of floating an immense weight without unloading, if they were furnished with large bars of vulcanized india-rubber, to be fastened around their bodies, and inflated on occasion. Emigrant waggons crossing rivers are often floated over by lashing empty barrels around them in the same manner. But such bags would require greater care than most teamsters would afford them, to keep them from holes, and waggon boats are indestructible. The inconveniences of the plan are only found in loading waggons. The absence of a moveable tailboard compels some considerable lifting in loading them; otherwise the plan is a good one.

In very broad rivers the waggon and cart bodies may be used as pontoons. Twenty-one waggons and forty-five carts will make a pontoon bridge five hundred and twenty-eight feet long. But the delay would be greater than under the flying bridge plan, from the necessity of unloading everything. After guns and caissons have been dragged through, the guns must of course be sponged and dried, as also the caisson chests.

To cross small deep rivers, trees should be cut down and made into bridges. A whole corps of cavalry with plenty of axes and lasso harness can bring down enough trees to make a good fixed bridge in half an hour; and if wood is plentiful enough this is the quickest and safest manner in which a heavy column can cross a river. But there must be an axe in every good squad for this; and there it ought to be.

I have now run rapidly over the principal lessons of the decade in regard to the proper employment of cavalry. In Europe, the military writers appear to be totally ignorant of all but the past. If we had been as much fettered by tradition as they, our cavalry would be as useless as theirs. In all the European wars since 1855 the cavalry has done absolutely nothing. In the Crimea it was sacrificed; in 1859 it stood a silent spectator of Solferino and Maganto; in 1866 it accomplished almost nothing, except in a few sabre and lance charges in small numbers. On our side of the Atlantic it speedily became the right hand of victory.

I have traced some of the causes and systems by which it became so valuable, avoiding book learning, and quoting from experience in the wherever available. In this first part I have given reasons and suggestions only. In the second I propose to submit a simple system of tactics and orders, dogmatically taught of necessity, the reasons for which will be found in this part.

## THE TREATY; THE FISHERIES.

To the Editor of the Gazette.

Sir,—With all the great and important rights and privileges surrendered by the High Commission to the United States—rights which no independent nation can without loss of prestige and honor surrender—I have looked in vain through the treaty for one right or privilege ceded by the States at any sacrifice, even of sixpence.

Take for example, the part of the treaty which most vitally affects us—the fisheries—and the only part in which, by the language and on the face of it, there seems to be a fair expression of reciprocity, and how does the case stand?

We are allowed, down to latitude 39° on the coasts of the States, the same privileges as we grant to the States fishermen. This, in language, seems fair enough; but when we consider the poverty of their and the wealth of our fisheries, this apparent fairness no longer exists. To compensate us for any difference in the value commissioners are to be appointed, who have power to award us what they may estimate as the amount of the difference.

Here our interests would appear to be sufficiently guarded, until the question is more fully stated,

1. It is absurd to suppose that Canadians would leave their rich fisheries, near their own doors, and go hundreds of miles to the poor or exhausted grounds along the American coasts for this apparent privilege. But in asking the compensation due Canada for the greater value of her fisheries, the plea that Canada never goes to the American coasts would not, of course, be admitted. For example, some of the American papers put down our fisheries at \$11,000,000, and theirs at seven—making the difference four millions. The half this, or two millions, would be all the commission could allow. To say that we never go to their grounds, would be met by—that's your own lookout. As the Americans come to our fisheries, and we do not go to theirs, it was a blunder to include theirs in the treaty, for then it would have stood thus—our fisheries are worth, says the Minister of Marine, nineteen millions annually. How much should the Americans pay for the right to fish on them,—never forgetting how soon they exhaust fishing grounds by their recklessness in throwing offal into the sea, &c. We have made no allusion to the admission of certain fish into the States free, for while it may, for the present, be a favour to our fishermen, we have yet to learn that to carry food to a people we should pay them, and not they us, for the right. Besides, we believe Canadians could, by improved methods of curing, and thus by putting more labour upon the raw material, finally get much higher prices than they now realize.

2. If the poverty of the American fishing grounds were not enough to keep us from them, the circumstances in other respects are quite against us. Neither party is allowed to land on private property and parts already occupied by fishermen. After a settlement of 250 years, how much of the American coast could be found not owned or so occupied? Yet, on the Canadian coasts there exists vast tracts not so taken up.

3. The assertion by the American Commissioners, that they did not admit the superiority of our fisheries, is, I suppose, quite in accordance with Yankee diplomacy. They were ready to go to war, if we can believe their President, to get the right for their countrymen to go hundreds and even

thousands of miles to grounds no better than their own; and down-easters did go hundreds of miles from their own grounds, risking the dangers of the sea and of capture, paying licenses, enduring all the toil, and spending the time necessary in such long voyages, and for no purpose but the luxury of poaching on fisheries “no better than those at their own doors.” We cannot but admire the strength of perversity which long practice has given our amiable cousins

4. We value, or ought to value, our fisheries above all price as nurseries for seamen; and in this England is even more interested than we.

This question would not be fully stated without reference to the rights which the United States got under a previous treaty, that of 1818, and these are secured to them by the present treaty. Those privileges extend over four hundred miles of the coast of Newfoundland, the whole of the Magdalen Islands—more than one hundred miles, and along the Coasts of Labrador indefinitely. For the concession of these vast rights, it must be remembered, that Canada never got any return, excepting the refusal to British subjects to navigate the Mississippi, which they had always possessed since the treaty with France in 1763, and which the United States confirmed in 1783. The fishing grounds granted by the treaty of 1818 equal an area of 40,000 square miles, or 25,600,000 acres, and are worth more twice told than so many acres of farming lands, yet the Americans are allowed to farm them free of all charges, taxes, &c., jointly with our own people. To these are now added the entire Atlantic coasts of British America, with all the islands, bays, harbours, and creeks. We may merely remark:

1. That the English Ministry have ceded rights in Canadian territory, which, if ceded in English, would cause a revolution, and probably and justly cost them their heads.

2. If it were a mere money matter as in the case of the Alabama claims, Canada would think little of it. We would pay the sum, and that would end it. But to cede proprietary rights, as in the fisheries and St. Lawrence, is not only much more serious but even alarming, surrendering as it does our very sovereignty.

3. If those very amiable English gentlemen expect by such surrender to secure the amity of the United States,—and this has been the burden of their song,—we would ask them why they did not do that by former treaties, as in 1815 and 1846, when vast territories were unconditionally surrendered with the delusive hope of buying the friendship of the Republic. *The United States have been the enemy but never the ally of England*, and always, in England's wars sympathizing with her enemies, whether they be the despot Napoleon—at whose instigation they declared war against England in 1812, the Autocrat Russian in 1856, the murderous sepoys of India, or the Ribbonmen of Ireland. Even the jail birds from English prisons, cannot escape the gushing sympathy of a Washington cabinet, for “birds of a feather,” &c.

J. H.

## THE CANADIAN FISHERIES

To the Editor of the Gazette.

Sir.—Few are aware of how very valuable to Great Britain have been her trans-atlantic fisheries.

“It is doubtful if the British Empire could have risen to its great and superior rank among the nations of the earth, if any other power had held possession of Newfoundland, its fishers having ever since its commencement, furnished our navy with