London (Would not a similar meeting be useful in Canada?). In a correspondence since made public between Lord Coleridge and Lord Halsbury, the Lord Chief Justice drew attention to various defects in the law which needed alteration, and at this meeting such subjects as the defects in the circuit system, the block in the Chancery Division, and what Lord Coleridge has described as the "disappearance" of commercial cases from the courts. The paper we have referred to feels that the "gratification that the community will feel when it realizes that the judges are actually condescending to consider the interests and convenience of litigants" is somewhat modified by the judges appropriating for their meeting a judicial day sacred to litigants, and says, "The judges have met to discuss the law's delay, and in doing so have appreciably increased the grievance which they are attempting to remedy. This, however, is a mere bagatelle compared with the far weightier question of the complaints heard on all sides against the present administration of justice and of the measures of reform by which those complaints can be silenced. Not least among the practical grievances under which the public groans is the difficulty, or utter impossibility, of obtaining satisfactory and speedy decisions in commercial matters. Some time ago it was recognized in judicial circles, with dismay, that merchants and bankers, and city men generally, were conspiring together to give the courts a wide berth. When this gloomy fact became apparent, the plan was attempted of reviving the old sittings at Guildhall: but hitherto the remedy has not proved efficacious. For some reason or other commerce shuns the law; and what those reasons are we may be sure that the conclave of judges either already know, or could very easily discover upon inquiry in the right quarters. Business men complain that the judges who try intricate commercial matters are often quite inexperienced in such questions. They may be fortunate enough to have their disputes heard before a judge who has spent all his previous career as an advocate in fighting such cases; but even then they have the jury to take into consideration, and juries are unknown quantities, whose verdicts may be admirable to-day and fatuous to-morrow. Added to this uncertainty as to obtaining real justice is the delay which occurs before the trials take place. This is not the fault of the judges but of the system. . . . The expense of litigation is enormously increased by the facilities which the law still gives for appeals, and appeals not only from the ultimate decision, but also on minor and 'interlocutory' points. Before a case gets into court at all, it is possible for half a dozen appeals to have been made, heard, decided, and overruled on the question of whether the plaintiff, who has brought an action to recover fifty thousand pounds for breach of a trade contract, shall be forced to disclose some highly unimportant particular connected with some subsidiary part of his claim. The retention of two Courts of Appeal is another fruitful cause, both of delay and expense. When the Judicature Acts were framed it was proposed to take away the appellate jurisdiction of the House of Lords, and to create one strong Court of Final Appeal instead. The spirit of compromise intervened, with the result that we have both the Court of Appeal and the appellate jurisdiction of the House of Lords—a profusion of judicial blessings which is more than a litigant expects and a good deal more than he in any