

members; but we are also members of a religious society, and as such strictly held to the obligations which it imposes upon us, entirely subject to its ordinances and bound to respect its rights. Let me, Sir, going at once to the point, state from that point of view what are the rights and the duties of each individual. It is an elementary and universally recognised principle in every society that power must be proportionate to the object which that society proposes to attain. By power must be now understood the entirety of the rights possessed by society, whether such rights are derived from society itself, the intrinsic source of power, or whether they are the results of certain agreements, the extrinsic source of power. In virtue of its nature, that is to say, of an intrinsic derivation, all society has a right to exact all that is requisite for the complete attainment of its object. Now, to obtain that result, a three-fold power is necessary: 1st. That of proposing in an obligatory form the means tending towards its object—legislative power; 2nd. That of compelling the proper application of such means according to the sense and in the manner prescribed by the authority proposing them—judicial power; 3rd. That of forcibly constraining those who refuse to apply them, and of reproofing those who attempt to obstruct them—coercive power. This necessity of power, as a means of attaining the end, does not limit its extent; it is the end itself which regulates and fixes it. In fact the end is the main element of all society; it is the source of its existence; this it is which determines the nature of the means, their proportion and their utility. It evidently follows from their nature that the means are subordinate to the end. It is now easy to draw a conclusion. Power in all society is a means which, of its nature, it has to attain its end; it is a means which must be subordinate to the end. Therefore, in all society, power, let its source be what it may, intrinsic or extrinsic, let its nature be what it may, legislative, judicial or coercive, must be proportionate to the end which society proposes to attain. Such is its extent. If we now glance at all societies at present existing on the face of the earth, the most cursory examination of the question will demon-

strate the existence of two principal forms of society, which include all others: 1st, Religious society, the Church; 2nd, Civil society, the State. If men unite and form societies, it is with a view of labouring for the attainment of benefits which prosperity confers upon them. Now all benefits composing the happiness and prosperity of mankind are included of necessity either in spiritual welfare or in temporal welfare. Thus civil society and the Church divide between them the attainment of this double welfare, temporal welfare falling to civil society and spiritual welfare to the Church. Thus the Church and civil society comprise all other societies. The existence of these two branches of society being admitted, let us consider the relations which may exist between them. These relations are not always alike, for the good reason that civil society or the State presents variation in its composition, which must of necessity influence its relations with the Church. It will be understood that a Catholic State cannot have the same relation with the Church as a heretical or an infidel State. But let us leave out of the question civil society, composed from a religious point of view,—first, of infidel individuals, society not under the dominion of the Church; second, of schismatical and heretical individuals, society separated from the Church, but subject to its power—to consider only civil society composed, still from a religious point of view, third, of Catholic individuals, society united to the Church and subject to its power. In this latter society, and this it is which distinguishes it from the other two, the individual belongs at once to both branches of society, to civil society as a citizen and to the Church as a Catholic. Now in every society the obligation obtains that the members of it should unite their power to attain a fixed end. In the case under consideration, he, therefore, who is at once a member both of civil society and religious society, is subjected to a double obligation, that of attaining the object of civil society, of which he is a member, and that of attaining the object of religious society, of which he is also a member. If these obligations be compared with each other, it will be found that they agree, that is that they exist without conflict or discord. Now societies, being under the same con-