

Barros has no evidence whatsoever about Norman's behavior in a decision session of any kind — within the Department of External Affairs or in inter-departmental committees — and leaves the subject untouched. But he speculates on the damage Norman did or could have done in Japan and as ambassador to Egypt and the Lebanon, again completely unencumbered by work in the relevant files. He dismisses as naive a Department of External Affairs analysis, by the Middle East Division, of his record in Cairo, and concludes:

No agent of influence would have been foolish enough to reveal anything in a telegram or dispatch. Of value to his true masters would have been the type of advice he might have tendered to his government and perhaps to others who could have been influenced by it. What Norman had supposedly said to Egyptians and other Arabs is virtually non-verifiable. Therefore, the Middle East Division's contribution would have been far more significant if his advice to Ottawa on how to handle Middle East events had been juxtaposed with Russian objectives in the region, particularly in Egypt (p.185-186).

I find Barros's reasoning difficult to follow here, but he, presumably, sees it as reinforcing his case against Norman, built as it is on the absence of evidence, and buttressed by conventional wisdom about Soviet intentions. In fact, Norman's assessment of Nasser's policies and intentions in the Suez affair was remarkably astute, his analysis of the emerging Middle Eastern crisis and Soviet preferences insightful, and his assessment of how the Western democracies should respond was both sound and responsible, especially in view of the fact that he did not reach Cairo until September 1956. In my view, one of the clues to Herbert Norman is his somewhat romantic view of Asia, his empathy with Third World aspirations, his sense of the anti-colonial, pro-nationalist historical trends that were hurried along by the Second World War and both constrained the behavior and limited the options available to great powers. Some of these views were evident in his attitude toward the issue of Indian independence. In that sense, and perhaps others, he was close to Lester Pearson.

### Assault on Lester Pearson

Barros's description of Lester Pearson — a liar, a motivated protector of Norman, a threat to the integrity of parliament, the pivot of an incompetent, oligarchical Department of External Affairs, the prime mover in a cover-up of Norman, a possible candidate for Soviet recruiters, and "...could one even dare to think the unthinkable, that Pearson was Moscow's ultimate mole?" (p. 201.) Certainly such a record makes what Barros sees as Pearson's low standing with Foster and Allen Dulles, Eisenhower and Eden, their lack of trust in him, perfectly predictable and entirely understandable. Pearson was clearly unfit, in Eden's opinion, to be Secretary-General of NATO. Presidents Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon were surely well informed about Pearson and no doubt shared the deep suspicions of him harbored in Washington. Thus the United States withheld information from or failed to consult the Canadian government, some United States officials may have regarded Pearson as "An ideological sympathizer and possibly a conscious agent of the communist

opposition, even though he was not under its control...as an agent of influence. Nor would it be unreasonable to speculate that, by the spring of 1957, at the latest, misleading information might have been passed on to him by the Americans...done deliberately in the hope that he would convey it to Moscow. The ploy would have been to misinform the Russians about American plans and policies. Regrettably, the theory cannot be tested at present, as documentation for the period in question cannot be examined at this time." Quite.

I conclude from Barros's treatment of Lester Pearson that he is simply out of his depth. He does not understand the nature of Canada's postwar relations with the United States, their shared assumptions, their essential harmony of interests, but Canada's need for effective distance, and the presence of certain soundly based differences over policy, demonstrated by the European Security plan, the off-shore islands issue and the recognition of Communist China and her admission to the UN. He does not understand Pearson's form and style of multilateral diplomacy. He knows little of the working relationship between Foster Dulles and Pearson, of their regard and respect, and basic trust. He has no idea of Eden's lack of understanding of the new Commonwealth, and its Third World leaders, of his contempt for it and for them. The harmony of United States and Canadian views toward the Suez crisis and their close cooperation are alien territory to him. He seems to have no understanding of the significance of the thoroughly laudable and entirely justifiable position taken by Dulles, Eisenhower and Pearson in the act of aggression by Israel, Britain and France against Egypt. It is a matter of scholarly research.

### Pearson and the Americans

Pearson stood firm on various issues, rarely lost sight of the political damage that excessive conformity to American preferences could bring, but recognized the quintessential significance of Canada's relations with the United States. As Livingston Merchant, the United States ambassador to Canada, reported to Dulles in July 1956, "He is intellectually persuaded that on balance the free world's interests would be better served by recognizing Communist China, but in the last analysis he would be controlled in the position he adopts by his assessment of the effect that recognition would have on Canadian relations with the United States. I am satisfied that he is convinced that for the foreseeable future, i.e., until the end of 1956, recognition by Canada is too costly a policy to be borne in terms of what our reaction would be" (Merchant to Dulles, July 20, 1956, *Dulles Papers*).

While Dulles liked and admired him, he was irritated by what he saw as Pearson's desire to be both loyal to the United States and NATO and to be the West's problem-solver at the UN and in issues involving the Third World. Pearson could be indiscreet. On March 27, 1956, Dulles complained to Pearson about Britain's hurried, preemptive and ill-conceived policies in the Middle East. Dulles recorded that Pearson "said that he was concerned and particularly worried about Sir Anthony Eden....He felt that he was not reacting very well to the strains and pressures of the present situation. He referred to the fact that his father had been quite eccentric....Up to the present time Eden had not had to bear the brunt of political attack and major responsibility as this had been carried principally by Churchill and that he (Pearson) had very real concern about the present