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fore them, but whose hearts still refuse to submit.

And lastly, those who seem to have made thorough and fair examination, and to have honestly arrived at the unsound belief which they entertain.

Now with regard to the first four of these classes, there can be no difficulty. No nice analysis is required here. An evil will, so to speak, is written on their foreheads. If their unsound beliefs be not the product of will, and of will deciding on the side of evil, we do not see, how anything a man *is*, or *does*, can be called a product of his will, and of that will choosing evil.

The only apparent difficulty is in relation to the last class specified, the class who seem to have arrived *honestly* at an unsound belief;—a class, however, whose representatives are but very rarely to be found. But even their case will be found, on the principles which we have explained clearly to involve an evil will.

For, the conditions essential to responsibility in all cases, and to which we have already referred, being supposed to be satisfied, if the will had not misled them in dealing with the evidence of truth before them, a sound conclusion, a right belief would necessarily have been come to.

Again in cherishing the full belief of error which they entertain, the will has decided in favor of that which is evil;-there has been a liking, an approving, a choosing of that evil ;--and especially, there has been a resolving or determining to act upon the practical obligations, not to good, but to evil, which the object of their bolief appeared to unfold; and in all this, there has of necessity been, what is sinful, culpable, punishable. Nay, had the will in their case been in harmony with the truth, it could not have decided in favor of error. In the case of a being whose will was pure, was in perfect harmony with the will of God, all the decisions of the will, would necessarily be in harmony with the truth of God. It could not approve or choose as good, that which God regarded as evil,-that which God had revealed as evil,-and reject that which He had revealed as good. Or if before pure, the first act of this kind, would be the first act of sin. And we are thus shut up to the conclusion, that wherever an unsound belief on moral and religious subjects is formed, it involves an evil act of the will. In the case of the class referred to, there may be, so to speak, less moral depravity.