

policy. They had a choice to make in 1945 between co-operating with the rest of us in rebuilding the world or alternatively seizing control of as great an area as possible. They made the latter choice. They drew the line of their influence as far away from Moscow as they could manage, and ever since they have been vigorously engaged trying on the one hand to extend that line and on the other hand to shut the rest of us out from behind it. They have been influenced also by a third motive - the fear that co-operation with the West might mean the gradual infiltration of Western ideas and news through to their own people. This would be a development which the Soviet dictatorship could not easily contemplate.

The political results of this decision by the U.S.S.R. are too familiar. They are to be seen on every hand in the great political problems of the post-war period which remain unsettled. They are to be seen in the Soviet Union's attempt to frustrate all common efforts for the restoration of peace and prosperity. It is only with the greatest difficulty, for example, that we have been able to make use of the United Nations, and in any circumstances where the interests of the U.S.S.R. are involved and where the Russians can make their veto effective, we are not able to make use of the United Nations at all. Similar efforts have been made to forestall the economic revival of Western Europe by aid from this continent. The attempt to organize that aid through United Nations machinery was almost completely defeated. When an alternative plan - the Marshall Plan - was developed by the Government of the United States in a very far-seeing, statesmanlike policy, the U.S.S.R. did its best to prevent that policy having effect. On every political front, therefore, we have to deal not only with the complex problem of the post-war period but also with the deliberate efforts of the Russian Communist government to prevent us from solving these problems.

The cultural and social consequences of Soviet policy in foreign affairs since the war are equally dangerous. We have seen the Russians, for example, engaged upon the task of whipping up the ideological war between Communism and capitalism; one of the most vicious forms of war mongering. If we have any doubt as to the intent to which this policy is deliberate, we have only to read the writings of Soviet leaders themselves. A recent statement of Soviet aims was made, for example, in a special article in PRAVDA by Lavrenti Beria, the head of Russia's vast internal security organization. On the occasion of Stalin's 70th birthday, he wrote as follows:

"Stalin has laid down a programme of action for Communists. They must (1) exploit all differences and contradictions in the bourgeois camp; (2) take concrete action to unite the working classes of the economically advanced countries with the national liberation movement in the colonies and dependent nations; (3) complete the struggle for unity of the trade union movement; (4) take active measures to bring together the proletariat and the small peasants; (5) support Soviet rule and disrupt the interventionist machinations of imperialism against the Soviet Union, bearing in mind that the Soviet Union is the base of revolutionary movement in all countries."

This is a programme for stirring up trouble in this country and elsewhere in the Western World. It is being carried out in many ways - by the Cominform, by Communist parties in all the Western states, and often by secret agents, as we have seen in our own country. The Communist parties of the Western states have now been finally unmasked - indeed have unmasked themselves - as rank and avowed adjuncts of the Soviet Communist parties, and we have witnessed the strange spectacle of political leaders in Western