

the USA government to release weapons from its own custody for use by that other government. These arrangements which of course are entirely defensive in character thus ensure that the United States retains not only the right but also the physical means to prevent the use of such weapons and accordingly in no way constitute proliferation.

If these arrangements were abolished, moreover it would be of one-sided advantage to the USSR and its allies. It would weaken NATO defences, with no corresponding reduction of the immense destructive potentiality of the nuclear weapons with their means of delivery possessed by the USSR. Thus the proposal set out in treaty language in Article I of the USSR draft would contravene the principle for disarmament negotiations, jointly agreed by the USA and the USSR and endorsed by the UNGA in Res. 1722 (XVI) that no measure of disarmament should confer a military advantage on any state or group of states. It seems clear that in its present form this provision of the USSR draft does not constitute a suitable basis for negotiation.

The USSR has stated that in its opinion the corresponding article in the USA draft is inadequate as it would seem to allow dissemination of nuclear weapons to nations within the NATO alliance. Neither existing NATO arrangements nor others which have been discussed constitute dissemination of nuclear weapons to nations within the alliance.

It seems obvious that the reconciliation of the two divergent views of what Article I should contain, and what the following article on the specific undertakings of non-nuclear nations should be, will require extended negotiations among all the nations affected. The problem is to draft and agree on a treaty which, while it will prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, and more specifically will prevent the emergence of more independent nuclear powers, will not inhibit the free political evolution of Europe and will preserve the right of all nations to enter into such political arrangements as they may wish, including collective defence arrangements provided always that such arrangements would not constitute nuclear proliferation.

The Canadian delegation finds the USSR draft defective also in the following respects. It contains no provisions for verifying that the parties are fulfilling their obligations. The USA draft treaty contains the provision that the parties will cooperate in facilitating acceptance of IAEA safeguards. The Canadian delegation feels that this is a provision which any nation that has no intention of manufacturing nuclear weapons should be willing to accept.

Article VI of the USSR draft, concerning withdrawal from the obligations of the treaty, is modelled on the corresponding article of the treaty prohibiting nuclear tests in the three environments, signed in Moscow. This