

establish its demilitarized status. Success in ensuring that both sides respect the zones as a form of *cordon sanitaire* could be a first step, however modest, on the way to de-escalation and might serve as a pilot project for the sort of supervised settlement which must eventually be achieved. The Commission also exists as the only remaining symbol of the 1954 Geneva settlement....For all these reasons, therefore, we consider that the maintenance of the Commission is both necessary and desirable....

Our Commission role has one further and very important advantage in that it gives us a special opportunity, available to very few others, of access to the capitals most directly concerned in the conflict. We have used this access and will continue to do so. Most of you will be aware of the two visits to Hanoi made by Mr. Chester Ronning as a special representative of the Canadian Government....

We have also explored with our Commission colleagues, India and Poland, the possibility of a useful role for the Commission in bringing the opposing parties closer together. Our efforts have not yet borne full fruit. Despite this, we intend to continue - either alone, or as a member of the Commission, or with other countries - our efforts to bring about peace talks and to find a path which may lead us out of this increasingly dangerous situation....

VIETNAM PROBLEM NOT UNIQUE

There are several characteristics of the Vietnamese problem which are common to other parts of Asia and indeed in some cases to other parts of the world. It is, for example, a partitioned state, a victim of what has been called "this century's awkward form of compromise". The 17th Parallel in Vietnam is certainly not the only one which has produced international crises. What has happened there provides further confirmation of the risks inherent in any attempt to remove agreed dividing lines by force, whether this force is manifested in open aggression or by subversion and infiltration. We can only work towards some realistic and relatively stable settlement comparable to those which have had to be accepted elsewhere.

The indirect methods of the Vietnamese war are a manifestation of the Communist doctrine of "wars of national liberation" so vividly described by Marshal Lin Piao last September. A future such as that envisaged by Lin Piao, consisting of a series of "liberation wars" supported by China, obviously will not bring about the stability and security which the states of Asia so desperately need. There are disquieting signs of developments elsewhere which points up the continuing danger of eruptions such as we now face in Vietnam.

Thailand, for example, is experiencing the same kind of terrorist attacks which characterized the early stages of the insurgency in South Vietnam. In Laos the areas under Pathet Lao control are being freely used for the movement of men and material from North to South Vietnam, and, as is shown by the latest report of the International Commission in Laos, made public earlier this week, members of the North Vietnamese armed forces have engaged in attacks against the armed forces of the Royal Govern-

ment of Laos - all in contravention of the undertakings given in Geneva in 1962. The Pathet Lao have, for their part, protested alleged bombings by United States aircraft of the territory they control. The Commission has indicated its desire to investigate these allegations but the Pathet Lao have not so far been willing to facilitate such a legitimate exercise of the Commission's functions....

It is sometimes argued that the shortcomings of successive governments in Saigon are somehow at the root of the tragedy that has befallen Vietnam - that the nature of government in the South provides the basis and excuse for Northern intervention. This argument is not adequate as a justification of aggression, since its application throughout the world obviously would soon result in international anarchy.

Furthermore, it is possible to recognize the inadequacy of governments in South Vietnam, and the existence of internal dissent, without concluding that the present war is in any significant measure the product of these. Internal dissent is something we must expect in any new country where the people live on the margin of subsistence. We must never forget, either, that the difficulties experienced by countries like Burma, Indonesia and Pakistan have shown that the achievement of a viable nationhood, as we in the West are sometimes inclined to forget, is never easy or quick, even in a relatively serene and secure international environment. In the atmosphere of war and subversion fomented from without, the difficulties become almost insurmountable....

First of all, the "war of national liberation" has not proven to be an effective instrument for the extension of Communist power in Asia. It can be a powerful weapon when used against single states groping their way towards social and political stability. In Vietnam, however, countervailing measures have been taken to redress the military balance and to meet the outside support essential to the success of the technique.

SEEDS OF HOPE

One of Peking's most important foreign-policy objectives has been the removal of American influence from Asia; by now, however, it must be becoming apparent to the Chinese that the sort of situation which was fostered in Vietnam has, as in Korea, led once again to the involvement of United States forces in a conflict on the Asian mainland. The clear determination of the South Vietnamese, the United States and others to prevent a forcible take-over by North Vietnam, must at some stage be taken into account in Hanoi and Peking. We can hope, therefore, that a realistic appraisal of the efficacy of "national liberation wars" eventually will lead to their abandonment.

Some would argue that if development towards a genuine balance of power was one of the hopeful aspects of the current situation in Asia, Canada might best serve the cause of peace by sending troops to participate in the Vietnam conflict. They would wish to see us take a position comparable to that of some nations in the area or of the great powers. They would be willing to abandon hope that the International Control Commission or any of its