

that the micro-disarmament component of an agreement must be closely examined. A peace agreement that does not realistically address the element of micro-disarmament is flawed for purposes of mandate and mission implementation, and there is little that the Secretary-General or a Force Commander can do to correct it short of additional ad hoc negotiations. Second, frequently there was an implementation problem due to insufficient resources, either financial, personnel or both. Third, peace agreements have many other components which will frequently be more germane to the peace process than micro-disarmament which is often seen as a confidence building as opposed to a non-proliferation issue. Some of these are free elections, resettlement, land reform, reformed security forces, recognition of new rights, etc. It is axiomatic that sometimes elements of the micro-disarmament component of an agreement may have to be sacrificed to achieve the more important aspects of the accord. Notwithstanding, there are a number of areas where a more systematic approach to micro-disarmament should improve results.

### **Micro-Disarmament Recommendations For Peace Operations**

The first step to micro-disarmament within the context of UN peace operations is to ensure that peace negotiations taking place in a given state, whether brokered by a UN facilitator, a guarantor state or states, other third parties or various groups within the state put micro-disarmament on the table as part of the negotiations. To this end a set of guidelines should be developed for negotiators outlining the benefits of micro-disarmament, principles to be applied (CSBMs, good faith, equality, sufficiency, public safety, etc), and suggestions for implementation guidelines (assembly areas, verification, control and destruction). Although difficult to guarantee funding at this stage, the offer of financial assistance, commensurate with the quantity and quality of light weapons handed over for destruction is a worthwhile consideration, whether this be in resettlement assistance or demobilization bonuses on an individual or collective basis.

Although it may be difficult to obtain agreement with all belligerents, there should be a reward and penalty factor for compliance or non-compliance within the micro-disarmament component of a peace agreement. This may include a bonus for the number of weapons handed in over a certain amount, or denial of assistance, if for example, arms caches are discovered that have not been reported or certain elements refuse to cooperate in either searching for or handing over weapons.

Once an agreement has been secured with a micro-disarmament component, care must be taken that the mandate accurately reflects the requirements of the peace agreement. Particular attention has to be given to financial and force resource allocation. There must be adequate time between the signing of a peace accord and force deployment to permit the