

General de Marinis (Italy) agreed with the views of MM. Loudon and Massigli. A large majority of the Preparatory Commission, after extremely protracted and detailed discussion, had succeeded in reaching an agreement on a number of proposals concerning the methods to be employed for the limitation and reduction of land and air armaments. If an attempt were now made to reopen the question on which agreement had been reached, the solution of the problem would be delayed rather than advanced; it would be extremely dangerous to issue instructions to the Preparatory Commission.

M. Sato (Japan) took the same stand as General de Marinis. He doubted the advisability of rediscussing points that had been settled. After a thorough exchange of views and mutual concessions, often secured at considerable cost, the Delegates had finally succeeded in surmounting numerous difficulties and in arriving at an understanding. The effect of the adoption of the British proposal would be to jeopardize all the results already obtained.

M. Lange (Norway), supporting Lord Cecil, recalled that the President of the Preparatory Commission had requested the Delegates to interfere as little as possible with the methods of work that hitherto had been followed by the Commission. If, however, the manner in which the preparatory work was being conducted involved serious risk, ought they to refrain from expressing their misgivings? It was a great pity that the question of trained reserves had been omitted from the Preparatory Commission's Draft Convention, and that limitation of armaments by budgetary expenditure had not been adopted. Referring particularly to Lord Cecil's point (d), he was strongly in favour of the recognition of a competent international authority which would be something more than a supervisory organ: it should be a body set up to watch progress and formulate suggestions for subsequent reductions. He thought that public opinion throughout the world was extremely alarmed at the small progress the League had made in disarmament. It was not an exaggeration to say that, if the present system of armaments continued for another ten years, they would undoubtedly be involved in another war.

M. Sokal (Poland) opposed Lord Cecil's resolution on the ground that if it were accepted, the Third Committee would become a sort of court for the rehearing or annulment of decisions taken by the Preparatory Commission.

M. Munch (Denmark), in accepting the resolution, stated that the Preparatory Commission had continued its patient work year after year during which more and more agreements likely to increase the feeling of security had been concluded: nevertheless it had not been possible to obtain a definite result in practical disarmament. M. Munch thought it might be advisable to refer to the Preparatory Commission the Draft Scheme for the Reduction of Armaments prepared two years ago by the Inter-Parliamentary Union so that the Preparatory Commission might submit that draft to the Disarmament Conference, thus following the course already adopted in the case of the Disarmament Draft of the Soviet Republics. The starting point in the Inter-Parliamentary draft was the present state of armaments. A gradual reduction was proposed in all countries in which armaments exceeded a certain level; this reduction to be based on the average armaments of the country in question during the previous three or five budgetary years. After detailing the various points in the Inter-Parliamentary Union draft, he concluded by saying that it was this scheme which, in his opinion, took most fully into account the complexity of the problem of disarmament.

Sir George Foster (Canada), who was in sympathy with the Cecil resolution, said that in Canada "there were no two opinions on the necessity for disarmament. . . . There were in Canada ten millions of people with their homes and their livelihoods. They had practically no navy and no army. . . .