

weapons on the Western side, and, inevitably, because we had not told them anything about it, suspicions had become very powerful by the end of the war in Moscow. The imaginative offer of sharing nuclear knowledge in the Baruch Plan failed, and the Cold War got under way as soon as the Second World War was over.

When the so-called Cold War began, all the Red Army needed to reach the Rhine was boots. There was practically no effective conventional deterrent against an attack on Western Europe. By 1949, four years later, Western Europe had persuaded the United States to offer it protection under the American nuclear umbrella, and that has been seen as the basis of Western Europe's security ever since.

On the other hand, the West never succeeded in using the bomb to dictate terms to the Soviet Union. Indeed, Mr. Byrnes admitted, by the time he retired, that "the Russians don't scare easy".

Nevertheless, the possibility of using nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union was considered, especially in Washington. We know from the documents released under the American Freedom of Information Act that the American Joint Chiefs of Staff did make plans for nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. In 1948, the plans involved the dropping of 50 bombs on 20 Soviet cities; in 1954, 1,000 bombs on Soviet cities. Fortunately, the government in Washington never adopted these plans, even at a time when the United States had practically a monopoly on nuclear weapons. And that monopoly eroded very fast.

By 1955, 10 years after the first nuclear explosions, the Soviet Union is believed by the West to have had 20 nuclear weapons. Almost immediately after that, the Russians launched the first Sputnik, and I was able to use the occasion at a meeting in Fiuggi in Italy to persuade the Ford Foundation to give us enough money to start the International Institute of Strategic Studies. By 1960, three years after the launching of the Sputnik, the Soviet Union had not only got 300 nuclear weapons, but had also got its own Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and a number of submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

The growth of this Soviet nuclear capability led Secretary Herter — and this is often forgotten — when he succeeded John Foster Dulles, as the American Secretary of State, to say that he could not imagine that the United States would ever use nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union unless its own survival were directly at