

erals who confronted Napoleon, the Archduke Charles. After saying that "he who in his plan of campaign counts on the resources of the country he is about to traverse to support his troops, abandons himself to chance, and often runs the risk of subordinating his operations to his subsistence," he thus discusses the new system:—

"Since the Revolutionary war, the French armies have introduced what they call the system of requisition; and it is not to be denied that this mode, joined to the coercive measures which they permitted themselves to use, has fed their troops at the expense of the territory occupied, and at places where want of time, means, or defence, hindered them from establishing magazines.

"But the system of requisition is not new, for in all times during war forced contributions have been raised; only this system has received in our time an extension prompter in its results, in this way—that instead of apportioning the burden on the countries occupied according to their resources, and re-entering them only after expeditions, to replace the provisions consumed in the interval, or to form stores for future wants, all the supplies are seized on entering a territory in order to use them for daily consumption, without prejudice to subsequent more regular requisitions which the victor has incontestably the right to order.

"This mode of subsistence gives doubtless more facility to rapid and sustained operations, and offers, above all, advantages for the detached divisions; but it does not for all that dispense with the necessity for forming magazines on convenient and secure points; besides, the system of requisitions, especially since it has been so extended, must ruin a country, and is applicable only to that of an enemy. It is in its nature more proper to wars of invasion than to those of position, because in the first it matters little that the country traversed is wasted and devastated, whilst for stationary armies, foresight demands that their supplies should be assured, which requires that the necessary provisions should be stored in magazines on points previously arranged.

"If then the system of requisition, magazines being excluded, cannot be adopted as an immediate base of the subsistence of armies, it is nevertheless true that it gives certain facilities for replacing daily consumptions, establishing new magazines, and keeping in reserve for anticipated needs supplies already formed. Thus this system carries with it of itself the necessity of establishing magazines on strategic points."

"The Archduke's maxims on magazines." Jomini remarks, "are in general very just; in fact, the more formidable armies are, the more necessary are magazines. All is subordinate, however, to the nature of the country, to the resources which it offers as you pass through it, and to the respective forces of the parties. Besides, to establish magazines is not to give up the power of making sometimes ten or twelve marches without carrying them with you when a decisive operation is in question, and armies of 80,000 to 100,000 men are in a fertile country. But to enter on a barren region already ruined, or which the enemy lays waste as he abandons it, and where the points of support and of arrival are far distant from those of departure, is to expose the army to disasters such as the French experienced in Russia and Portugal. It was not that they had neglected to form magazines and to organize trains; but these were so far from the corps employed that the advantages of them became illusory."

It will be easily seen that this republican

system could not be applied by an army acting either in its own or in friendly territory. It was equally impracticable for the British in Spain, and for the Austrians in Germany and in Italy. Those armies could only draw their subsistence either from their own countries or from the willing contributions, duly paid for, of the people in whose countries they were operating. But however supplies may be obtained, the storing of them in magazines along the lines on which the army operates, is indispensable—and it is therefore necessary to inquire what is the method of forming depots to which all generals must resort. This is evidently a matter on which it is in vain to theorize and on which nobody is entitled to be heard on whom has not rested the responsibility of providing for the subsistence of armies. Let us hear the Archduke Charles on it:—

"As every line of operation ought to be covered by the movements and positions of the army, it follows that the most favorable points for depots of stores ought to be on that line; and as this line determines at the same time the direction of all movements, progressive or retrograde, it also indicates the most convenient roads for the transport of subsistence.

"To limit to a single line the establishment of depots and the arrival of convoys of materials necessary to the well-being of an army, is very difficult. They should therefore be placed upon many points which have sure communication with the line of operation—the more these points are multiplied, the more free will be the circulation and the surer the subsistence.

"The extent of country covered by an army increases with the distance from that army. It is right, then, only to establish some magazines close, and the majority at a greater distance in rear—the first to supply the needs of a few days, the others great depots. In the case of convoys, also, in order that they may be well covered, all the roads they move on should close toward the line of operation in proportion as they approach the army, and end by joining it. The concentric direction of the convoys may be good; but it will be so only against the attacks of great regular bodies. Good partisans will annoy the convoys always, whatever the direction of their routes, even if perpendicular from the centre of the base to the centre of the front, the case in which they are the least exposed to an assailant.

"Even fortresses cannot safely be made depots of, if the communications with them are precarious, for it is very seldom that an escort can defend a convoy against serious attacks. Strategic points only are proper for the establishment of great magazines, because generally they are at the centre of communications and offer every facility for the arrival of stores and their transport to the front, even should unforeseen circumstances cause a change of direction. Magazines, then, must not be established off the line of operations on points which are not united to it by many roads and in different directions.

"The relations between an army and the country behind it change according to the march of events and the successive occupation of the strategic points aimed at; so that the line of magazines must be modified by the movements of the army that there may be no break in the convoys; this applies to offensive movements as well as to retreats. To develop these principles we will take as an example the case of an army that marches from the Moldau to the Wernitz, following the line Budweis, Neumarkt,

Ratisbon, Donauwerth. And we will suppose—

"1st, That when the army quits Budweis the enemy is so distant that the principal magazines can be established on the line of operation, so that supplies will be available throughout the progressive movement.

"2nd, That great magazines will be established on the first line only, at a convenient distance from the army; from which others will be placed at intermediate points up to the front, where depots of immediate distribution will be formed for eight, or ten days at most.

"3rd, That neither these advanced magazines nor those at the greatest distance in rear are here spoken of, nor the direction taken by the convoys, which would be superfluous.

"Under these conditions, the establishment of magazines follows the movements of the army at the following stages:

"1st stage. When the army advances from Budweis toward Klattau, the magazines are at Prague, Budweis, Ufar-Linz (opposite Linz).

"2nd stage. Army at Klattau—magazines at Pilsen, Horadizowitz.

"3rd stage. Army at Ratisbon—magazines at Waldmunchen, Cham, Straubing.

"4th stage. Army at Ingolstadt—magazines at Ratisbon and Stadlam-Hof.

"5th stage. Army on the Wernitz—magazines at Kupferburg, Koshing, Vohburg.

"In retreating, the evacuation of magazines is accomplished on the same principles, thus:

"1st stage in retreat. Army quits the Wernitz—magazines at Stadlam-Hof, Ratisbon.

"2nd stage. Army quits Ingolstadt—magazines as in 3rd stage," etc., etc.

From this elaborate arrangement we see how much of a general's time and thoughts must be occupied with matters which are quite cast into the shade by his marches and battles, but without which his marches and battles would be impossible.

Jomini, without entering into such minute details as the foregoing, also touches on the subject. After remarking that soils, the seasons, the force of armies, the spirit of the population, are all variable causes influencing the supplies, he says the following general maxims may be established: That in fertile and populous countries the inhabitants of which are not hostile, an army of from 100,000 to 120,000 advancing towards the enemy, but still far enough distant from him to be able to include without danger a certain extent of country, may march during the time required for an operation, say one month drawing its resources from the country; that during this time all possible activity must be used to collect all the resources of the country to form magazines of reserve, and to supply the wants which the army will experience after the success of the operation, whether to concentrate in positions for repose, or to start anew on fresh enterprises; and that the magazines which shall have been collected by purchase or requisitions ought to be placed as much as possible on three different radii of communication, which will facilitate, on the one hand, the supply of the wings, and, on the other, the widest extension possible of the sphere of successive requisitions.

The effect of railways in modifying the conditions of war is in nothing so important as in the supply of armies. The enormous transport trains which formerly passed between an army and its base, may now be generally in great measure be dispensed with, and the connection will be maintained,