

The second question raised by Mr. Graydon is a good deal more difficult. In the first place, as Mr. Coldwell has said, we have no official knowledge as yet of the conclusions reached by the military staff committee. The military staff committee has been meeting in secret session and its report has not been made available to us.

Secondly, I would doubt whether the clause in the charter, to which Mr. Graydon has drawn attention, is capable of the very broad interpretation he has given it. It says,

Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the [Military Staff] Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work.

Now, I am not an expert on the work of the Military Staff Committee but, for the present, I think it has been given instructions by the Security Council to work out the general principles which should govern the conclusion of the special military agreements. It would seem to me reasonable to assume that the problem of working out the special agreement should be approached by first working the agreements with the great powers. The agreements with the great powers having been worked out, it would then be easier to work out agreements with the other Members of the United Nations. Presumably, when they come to the question of drafting an agreement with Canada, then we will be asked to participate. Presumably also, we will be asked to participate in any discussion of the possible use of Canadian forces against an aggressor.

We are now in a position to maintain contact with the work of the Security Council and with other aspects of the work of the United Nations. We have our permanent delegation in New York to the Atomic Energy Commission and we are also able to send people down to New York on occasion. We have, for example, been represented at discussions in the Security Council on atomic energy matters by General MacNaughton and by Mr. Ignatieff. We have been represented by Mr. Riddell on the Security Council, when the Council was recently discussing the trust agreement proposed by the United States for the former Japanese mandated islands.

On the general question which Mr. Graydon has raised as to the newspaper reports of the conclusions of the military staff committee, even if those reports turn out to be correct, I do not think they would necessarily come as a surprise to us. If you will look up the discussion in our report on San Francisco, pages 35 and 36, concerning enforcement action, you will find that we drew particular attention to the fact that the provisions of the charter of the United Nations for the use of force against a peace breaking state have to be read along with the chapter on voting procedure in the Security Council. Under that chapter on voting procedure, any one of the five great powers can veto the application of enforcement arrangements. We go on to say this;

Thus, the Organization could not in practice use force against a Great Power or indeed against any other state if one of the Great Powers exercised its veto. The peace enforcement proposals were limited, not only by the Yalta voting formula [which was incorporated in the charter], but also by the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals on transitional arrangements. It was apparent from these Proposals that the Organization's enforcement powers were not to be used against enemy states.

We went on to say in the report on San Francisco, "The actual use of force under the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals was thus a remote contingency since the mere willingness of all the Great Powers to use force would ordinarily be sufficient to bring any conceivable combination of middle and small powers to heel." I think, therefore, that we have frankly faced from the beginning this difficulty in the United Nations about the enforcement of sanctions.