

The Government has not yet announced through what channels it intends to allocate the \$18 million of assistance and how much each of the possible channels would receive. Aid could go through the direct bilateral channel to the Indian Government in the form of goods, food, services or direct financial contributions; through the multilateral channels of the UN and its agencies, particularly the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR); or through the Canadian voluntary agencies working in the field. The president of CIDA told the Committee that his organization was recommending that a fairly large proportion of the aid go to Canadian voluntary agencies.

(b) To East Pakistan.

Through the World Food Program the Canadian Government has shipped \$7 million in food aid (wheat) for the relief of suffering in East Pakistan. This is normal food aid originally allocated by CIDA to all of Pakistan but now channelled to East Pakistan by agreement with the Pakistan Government. Canada has also provided \$500,000 to the United Nations to help defray the cost of the United Nations relief operations there. Further, the International Emergency Relief has been provided with blankets, medicine and canned fish at a cost of \$35,000 excluding transportation costs which were absorbed by the Canadian Armed Forces. The total value of Canadian contributions to East Pakistan stands at \$7,535,000 at the end of November.

III Refugees in India

(a) The number of East Pakistan refugees in India.

There has been a great discrepancy between the Pakistan government's and the Indian government's count of the number of refugees in India. Pakistan has said there are between 2-4 million whereas India has said there are over 9 million. The president of CIDA, after talking to UN and World Bank officials and scrutinizing the situation himself, including the Indian method of registration which he described as "reasonably accurate" and "fairly efficient" decided that a figure of between 7 to 9 million should be used. The Committee accepts this assessment. The vast majority of these refugees are Hindu and well over 60% of them have gone to the already crowded Indian state of West Bengal. The evidence presented to the Committee indicated that there were relatively few young men of military age among the refugees in the refugee camps. Until the outbreak of open warfare, the refugees were continuing to pour into India although at a somewhat reduced rate (15,000 a day in October as compared to 40,000-50,000 a day in August). Before the outbreak of war, it had been estimated by the Pakistan Government that 240,000 refugees, a majority of them Moslems, had gone back to East Pakistan.

(b) The cost to India.

The World Bank Report estimated that if the refugees were to remain in India, the cost to India of this enormous number of refugees could amount to \$700 million for the full financial year to March 31, 1972. At the end of November the international community had pledged only \$277 million, and of this \$180 million had been pledged through the United Nations System. A new appeal to help bridge this gap has been launched by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).

The cost of the influx to India must also be measured in terms of the disruption and postponement of ongoing development programmes so vital to the future well-being of India. Not only materials and trained personnel but also domestic funds allocated to national development have had to be diverted from pressing national projects. It has been estimated that India has been obliged to use scarce foreign exchange funds (perhaps \$70 to \$100 million in 1971-72) over and above the amounts offered by donor countries in order to import various necessities for the relief programme. In addition, internally, the Indian Government runs the risk of economic dislocation and even communal strife for providing 9 million refugees with a minimum standard of food and shelter which many of their own population do not have.

These costs would be a tremendous burden for any country but they could prove to be crushing for a country struggling as India has been to strengthen its fragile economy.

IV East Pakistan

Early in the crisis in East Pakistan, it had been feared that the area, only recently severely dislocated by a disastrous cyclone, would face a major food shortage if not a famine. Later the situation appeared to have improved, at least up until the outbreak of open warfare. Although the President of CIDA spoke of the possibility of "pockets of starvation" in certain districts, he considered that certain factors including the good harvest in August, the substitution of food crops for jute crops and the importation of foreign food supplies had greatly increased the food supply. At the same time the population had decreased with the outflow of refugees. The Committee has noted that the President of CIDA stated on December 2, that he would not be recommending additional food aid to East Pakistan within the next six months as there was a sufficient supply in his estimation. Even before the outbreak of war between India and Pakistan, the crucial problem related to East Pakistan's food supply was the distribution system.

V Distribution of Aid

(a) East Pakistan.

During recent months, the major East Pakistan port of Chittagong has been so clogged with food shipments that the fourth Canadian grain-carrying vessel had to be diverted to Singapore for temporary storage. Warehouses in the port are full. Yet the distribution of this food in East Pakistan has remained sadly inadequate. Transport-