



Personnel du Ministère aidant à évacuer les Canadiens du Liban, pays déchiré par la guerre, en juillet 2006.

Department employees help to evacuate Canadians from war-torn Lebanon in July 2006.

SOURCE: DAVID FOXALL

13. In Croatia, meanwhile, the changed reality on the ground following Croatia's offensive in Sector West has clouded UNCRO's future, with less than four weeks to go before its forces should be redeployed in the remaining three sectors. Their exact functions are still to be worked out, particularly in light of the deep mistrust between Zagreb and Knin that will make implementing the existing ceasefire and economic agreements that much more difficult. The planned movement of ARGBAT [Argentinian battalion] from what was Sector West to Sector South (next to CANBAT I) is on indefinite hold following the objections of the Krajinan Serbs who believe the Argentinians did nothing to stop the Croatian army and police sweeping through Sector West. Even if UNCRO can be redeployed by 30 June, it is highly questionable whether there will be enough progress in restoring Croatian control over the occupied territories during the following five months to prevent Zagreb threatening yet again not to renew the mandate when it expires at the end of November.
14. Canada does not have any significant influence on any of the parties to the conflicts in Bosnia or Croatia, nor do we have the potential military or economic clout to acquire that influence. Rather, our influence is on the International Community and how it seeks to address the unresolved issues that are the foundation of the fighting, derived through our stature as respected, credible peacekeepers on the ground, and as members of some of the key organizations involved in these conflicts (United Nations Protection Force, United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation, NATO). As we have seen before, however, it is a constant