

Observations:

The United Nations in its *Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned from United Nations Operations in Somalia, April 1992 - March 1995*,⁶⁹ concluded *inter alia* that a UN peacekeeping force is unsuited for non-voluntary disarmament and demobilization. The importance of including the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration requirements in the peace agreements and implementing them in close coordination between the military, political and humanitarian components of the mission with NGO concerns duly taken into account was stressed. In addition, the UN cautioned that "demobilization is an expensive exercise and Member States need to provide resources that will enable the demobilized personnel to be reintegrated into the community."

The Report draws the fundamental link between disarmament and a secure environment. People will be unwilling to disarm without a functioning police force to protect them. Many ordinary Somalis were ready to disarm in return for security but UNOSOM II did not have sufficient personnel to provide such a guarantee. Beyond this, disarmament is intimately related to a functioning political process which seeks genuine reconciliation.

UNOSOM II's disarmament efforts were also undermined by the extremely porous nature of Somali borders and, in sharp contrast to both Central America and Cambodia, the absence of a regional consensus to constrain arms traffic.

As with UNTAC, the slow deployment of UNOSOM II meant that the fragile consensus reflected by the Conference on National Reconciliation was largely dissipated before the main UN force had established itself.

United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)

Peace negotiations began in 1988 between the Mozambique government Frente da Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) and the rebel forces Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) to end the longstanding civil war. By May 1992 the UN joined the process including Military Observers to provide technical advice on cease-fire demarcation and on demobilization. At the time of the signing of the General Peace Agreement (GPA) in Rome in October 1992, RENAMO forces controlled wide areas of the countryside and one large town; the economy was in ruins and the country in the grip of a crippling drought. Most importantly, perhaps, each side had come to the realization that it was probably incapable of achieving military victory over the other.

⁶⁹ Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Germany *et al* in cooperation with the UN DPKO, *Comprehensive Report on Lessons-Learned in Somalia, April 1992-March 1995*, Sweden 1995 at pp. 75-78.