

## XII Summary and Conclusions

All nations involved in the arms control process recognize the critical importance of verification. No arms control agreement will be based on trust alone; effective verification must be ensured for the continued viability of the arms control process and the resulting agreements.

Verification, like arms control itself, can be both a product — a regime spelled out in a treaty document — and a process. Verification includes the design and negotiation of regimes to meet security requirements; policy decisions about what constitutes effective verification; the implementation of verification requirements of completed agreements; the evaluation of compliance with existing agreements; and the determination of appropriate responses to ambiguous situations or clear non-compliance with specific provisions of agreements. The requirements for verification and verification regimes themselves vary with the international climate. The better the political relationship among the negotiating parties, the higher the confidence in compliance and the simpler (and less costly) the regime.

To assess verification trends to the year 2000, it was necessary to develop a set of assumptions that take into consideration geopolitical constraints and realities about international relations and the arms control process. This study assumes a continued and constructive relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and whole-hearted co-operation in the area of arms control among the developed states. It recognizes a shift in "the threat," away from East-West and toward North-South, South-South and possibly North-North. This shift leads to the prediction that multilateral agreements will become more complex and more significant than bilateral treaties.

Other assumptions regarding the arms control process during the coming decade include the following: CFE I and II will be completed; an SNF treaty will either be overtaken by events or

completed; a START I agreement will be negotiated and START II will be nearing completion; and efforts will be under way to bring the British, French and Chinese forces into START III negotiations; the ABM Treaty (clarified) will remain in force and SDI research will continue but there will be no decision to deploy a space-based system; interest will grow in tactical ballistic missile and cruise missile defence; the NPT will remain an important multilateral agreement with major efforts expended to maintain its continued viability; the CWC negotiations will continue; there will be mounting pressure for naval arms control; there will be pressure for a complete test ban, a cut-off in production of fissionable materials and more effective measures to control the transfer of advanced weapons and associated technologies; and, finally, NATO, the CSCE and the UN will play increasingly important roles in developing and implementing verification regimes and CBMs.

In the area of evolving verification trends and their implications, several key findings emerge from this study. NTM will continue to be the dominant factor in the verification of bilateral agreements. Multilateral agreements will require the development of multilateral or international technical means (MTM or ITM), to be employed under regional or UN auspices. Co-operative measures, including data exchanges, notifications and on-site inspections (OSIs) will remain an essential part of future verification regimes; however, there will be significantly less emphasis on the very intrusive forms of OSI (such as anywhere/anytime suspect site inspections). The important synergistic effects among these various modes of monitoring and verification will be recognized increasingly. There also will be increased emphasis on CBMs and transparency measures, including an Open Skies agreement. However, military significance will continue to be the criterion for determining effective verification, even though people will differ over the

