

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

The major achievement of Working Group 4, the result of intensive work during recent weeks, is contained in the proposed annex on chemicals. The general outline of such an annex was proposed by my delegation last year. Sweden welcomes the constructive and supportive approach taken by all delegations in considering the annex, as well as their substantial contributions to it. The text now contained in Group 4 working paper 4/3/Rev.3, brought to the attention of the Committee and recommended for close scrutiny in capitals during the May recess, confirms our belief that such an annex is a practical and indispensable part of the draft convention.

As regards the contents of the annex, the Swedish delegation maintains a flexible approach regarding the placement of some of the chemicals in the existing lists. We do not, however, accept the view that toxins are of no concern to the chemical weapons convention on the grounds that they are covered by the biological weapons Convention. Toxins which have been weaponized or field-tested for chemical weapons purposes are for all practical purposes indistinguishable from other chemical weapons and should, in our view, be included in schedule [1]. Once included, however, my delegation feels that they are sufficiently covered by the definition of super-toxic lethal chemicals. Therefore, no special category of ultra-toxic lethal chemicals would be called for.

In the discussion we have also noted a tendency to argue that precursor chemicals highly relevant for the convention should be placed in schedule [3] rather than in schedule [2], part A, for the simple reason that they are commercially produced for purposes not prohibited by the convention. In the opinion of my delegation, the fact that a chemical is in fact being produced does not exactly reduce the risk it may pose to the convention. In our view, key precursors do not belong in schedule [3]. In that schedule, only such precursors should be listed which are produced in such quantities as to render the verification régime under schedule [2] impracticable. Finally, there would also seem to exist a contradiction between the search for so-called "verification gaps" elsewhere in the convention on the one hand, and a tendency to minimize the concrete concern caused by production of certain key precursors on the other.

During the summer, special emphasis will have to be given to the complex issue presently covered by schedule [2], part B. For the first time the text in the annex now contains the mention of certain chemicals. Two general criteria are also contained in the section entitled "Guidelines for schedule [2], part B". My delegation would hope that these elements, possibly together with a consideration of proposals for a "waiting and warning list", will permit substantive progress in the near future.

Sweden welcomes the constructive discussion on the guidelines for schedules [2] A and [3], which has produced new texts enjoying a considerable degree of support. We think those guidelines could be consolidated further and the guidelines for schedule [1] somewhat simplified. Those definitions which have now been transferred to the annex on chemicals call for detailed