

Mr. EKEUS (Sweden):

May I start with a short statement on behalf of the Group of 21 when we congratulate the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom, on the impressive report of the work of the Committee during the 1986 session and also express our gratitude to him personally for the efforts, so characteristically skilful, patient and tactful, that decisively influenced the successful outcome of the negotiations on chemical weapons during the 1986 session. With this proven ability of the Chairman of the Committee, it is indeed with high expectations that we look forward to the intersessional work under the direction of Ambassador Cromartie, ably assisted by Mr. Rowe of Australia and Mr. Poptchev of Bulgaria. And with that I end the statement on behalf of the Group of 21.

One of the outstanding key issues in the question of the long inspection. Under work on this issue has been carried out within working Group 2 of the Committee under the guidance of Mr. Vinogradov of Indonesia.

We note the statement, repeated in the Conference as late as earlier this week, by the United States, that the challenge inspection arrangements contained in the United States proposal, document CD/336, is not a take-it-or-leave-it proposal. We have in this context studied with great attention the recent proposal by the United Kingdom, document CD/313, which contains some impartial elements. Likewise, we consider the proposal, by the German Democratic Republic and Poland, document CD/CW/SP.134, and by Pakistan, document CD/343, as being helpful to the work.

My delegation shares the view that if, in exceptional circumstances, there were serious and well-founded suspicions of significant breaches of the provisions of the Convention, a State Party should be obliged to accept some form of on-site inspection without undue delay. At the same time, it is of the greatest importance that provisions for such inspections take into consideration legitimate security interests of State Parties and that they should not, in this context, be used for purposes not directly connected to the Convention on Chemical Weapons.

During recent years we have developed a well-balanced and rather robust organizational framework for the work of the Ad Hoc Committee. This system has served us well. Also, the method applied by the Chairman of the Committee to concentrate the negotiations on the continuing development of a rolling text has worked well and ascertained that results achieved during earlier negotiations have not been lost. When the negotiations now are approaching more decisive stages, the subjects for negotiations appear to be more specific and more diverse than before. On the one hand, there are a number of problems of great political and technical significance and complexity; on the other hand, there is a need of issues still remaining after general agreements have been reached on some of the main issues. Further, there are several problems necessary for the future convention which so far have not been touched upon and have been subject only to a limited consideration.

The organization of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee next session should, in the opinion of my delegation, be designed with these new characteristics of the subject matter in mind. It should thus be possible to discuss the