

Hardest of all to assess is the impact that a CTBT would have in reinforcing the NPT — and with it the entire nuclear non-proliferation regime — by providing potent evidence of the determination of the nuclear-weapon states to fulfil a key aspect of the “basic bargain” between the nuclear haves and have nots that underlines the NPT.

While this benefit may be as unquantifiable as the global norm of non-proliferation itself, at the very least it can be said that the moral authority of the nuclear-weapon states — that is, of the United Nations Security Council five permanent members — would be strengthened, and along with it, their ability to exercise effective leadership in response to countries seeking to stand against this international norm.

A comprehensive test ban treaty then is no panacea for nuclear proliferation, either vertical or horizontal. As important as it is, it is not a substitute for sustained action by the international community on all fronts, from the strengthening of global non-proliferation norms and their enforcement, through the broadening and deepening of supplier groups, down to rigorous implementation of national export controls.

Central to the process of strengthening the global nuclear non-proliferation regime is the indefinite and unconditional extension in 1995 of the lynchpin of that regime, the NPT, together with the relentless pursuit of its universal adherence. Particularly important as well is the work underway in the International Atomic Energy Agency to strengthen the nuclear safeguards regime to permit “anytime, anywhere” inspections. Equally urgent is the need for Ukraine and Kazakhstan to follow the lead of Belarus and to unambiguously and unequivocally formalize their status as non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT.

At the same time the international community has the right to expect, and the duty to demand, from the five nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT continued progress towards their fulfilment of the nuclear disarmament objectives enshrined in Article VI.

One thing we cannot afford, however, is to make progress in one area of non-proliferation conditional on progress in another — what Under-Secretary-General Petrovsky has called counterproductive “linkage diplomacy.” In my view, the

cause of international security is ill-served by arguments and stratagems that have the effect — however unintended — of shielding, rather than exposing, would-be nuclear proliferators. The danger of nuclear proliferation is all too real. What is required is an acceleration of efforts along as many tracks as possible to get the job done. Again, to use Petrovsky’s words, what is required is “constructive parallelism.”

It is from this perspective then that I now turn to the prospects for a CTBT.

cause the UK tests only in the US, the result was an involuntary moratorium for that country as well.

The legislation under the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act pursuant to which this American action was taken — however grudgingly by the then Bush administration — marks a watershed in international efforts to achieve a global test ban. Critically important are the provisions of the legislation that require the Administration to submit annually to Congress a plan for achieving a comprehensive ban on the testing of nu-



The mushroom cloud from an atmospheric nuclear explosion. Above-ground nuclear tests were banned by the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, as were tests in outer space and under water. Canada has long advocated a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty to prohibit nuclear tests in all environments for all time.

Photo courtesy of the Canadian Centre for Global Security

Prospects for a CTBT

I think it is no exaggeration to say that the need for a CTBT has not been greater, or the prospects for achieving one brighter, in a very long time indeed. All five declared nuclear-weapon states are now party to the NPT. Russia has been observing a testing moratorium since October 1991 and France since April 1992. In July of that year, the US renounced modernization as the basis for any of its nuclear tests. Next came its decision in October 1992 to join France and Russia in declaring a nuclear testing moratorium. Be-

clear weapons on or before September 30, 1996.

In a letter to Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell dated February 12, 1993, President Clinton rejected as totally inadequate the report submitted in January by the Bush Administration. He then went on to indicate that he would submit a new report as soon as his review was completed of “questions relating to the forum and modalities for negotiating a CTB and the related question of resuming a limited program of US nuclear testing after July 1, 1993.” The significance of the quoted por-