I therefore suggest respectfully that the Commission examine the question of the employment of rapporteurs and associate rapporteurs, for both codification and the progressive development aspects of the Commission's duties, from persons other than those who are members of the Commission.

A second possible approach to this question of the Committee's efficiency -- although I do not mean to imply that the Committee is in any way inefficient -- may be found in the idea of dividing the Commission into chambers so that perhaps two or more projects can be considered at the same time rather than seriatim as must be the case with the Commission now operating as a committee of the whole. I realize that this matter has been discussed before both in the Commission and in the Sixth Committee itself and I believe that there is some reluctance to divide the membership of the Commission in a way that would prevent any of its members from sharing in the Commission's studies and recommendations. But I think this difficulty can be overcome by having the work of each chamber submitted to the membership of the Commission as a whole. And I would expect that the corporate sense of the Commission, as a whole, would in most cases lead to a general attitude of critical approval to the work of any one of its two chambers.

I now wish to turn to the report of the Commission covering the work of its eleventh session. I would suggest that the very substantial and creative research already done on the Law of Treaties in the reports prepared by the late Professor J.L. Brierly, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht and by the present Chairman of the Commission, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, represents an important contribution to international law in this field, altogether apart from whatever final results may emerge in the form of a possible code or multilateral convention. We must be very grateful, therefore, to the many years of intensive scholarship these reports represent. There are one or two questions, however, that concern me about the draft articles on the Law of Treaties presented in the report of the Commission. As many of the delegates already have indicated, and my Delegation shares this view, it would not be desirable to discuss, in any detail, the substantive questions raised by the articles presently to be found in Chapter III of the Commission's report.

I do wish to suggest, however, that the discussions during the past few days on the question of the advantages of a multilateral convention incorporating the provisions of the Commission's proposals as against a code may be premature, not only because one should see the document as a whole but possibly for a more important reason. For there is a question which we have not examined. Some of the articles proposed by the Commission deal with narrow questions of form, others deal with mixed questions of form and substance, particularly the problems of validity, and, finally, we have yet to see the draft articles dealing with the meaning or interpretation of treaties -- surely a most important part of the Commission's studies and any final report. I would like to suggest that we keep our minds open on this whole question of code versus treaty, because we may discover that, far from having to decide upon either method, there is a third alternative -- namely, placing those purely formal articles on the negotiation, authentication, signing and similar formal questions in the form of a multilateral convention, while preferring to place the articles dealing with the meaning and interpretation of treaties, and possibly questions of validity, in a declaratory code. My reasons for suggesting this possibility to the Commission, and to members of the Committee, are that it very well may be that the purely technical aspects of treaty-forming do lend themselves to reasonably strict definition. Indeed, there may be many advantages in achieving uniformity of practice by such a multilateral agreement. On the other hand, the broader questions of interpretation, of validity, of the nature of a treaty obligation including reservations, conceivably might be more happily placed in a code that is declaratory of general principles rather than fixed in a multilateral treaty. Some such division may make much more sense, having in mind the functional differences between