

influence which the opinions of the people as expressed by their representatives ought to have upon the Government, the popular power does not and cannot extend to absolute control upon the Government by other means than positive violence, which is productive of too many calamities, and of too much positive evil, to be slightly resorted to.

The refusal of supplies, as respects the Civil List in this country, never has had any effect which the well-founded remonstrances of the representative body would not in themselves have had; very much injustice, great oppression to individuals has been occasioned by the measure; but it always has been, and always must be, ineffectual for the intended purpose. Nay, it is less than ineffectual, for the evils created thereby raise up a strong antagonist principle, and the public evil becomes so great, and the injustice and cruelty of the proceeding so apparent, that the destruction of all liberty is the consequence, one not brought about merely by the appliance of power from abroad, but assented to and maintained by the people themselves.

Why then lose the advantage of having one important subject not liable to daily debate? why not have something settled and decided? and why not trust to our power of influencing the Government by remonstrance and complaint, if such be provoked, instead of keeping by us the desperate and most ineffectual expedient of a civil list under the control of yearly sessions of Parliament?

Such are the broad considerations of the question; but let the reformers, who wish for responsible government so far as it can be attained, or procured from a supreme government, which can have no interest separate from those of the people of the province—let them call to recollection scenes which themselves have witnessed. They surely cannot wish that the members of a united government such as they advocate, should be forced to cringe about the lobbies of the House of Assembly, to gather friends to oppose some motion for the reduction of salary, instigated by private malice, but ostensibly founded upon patriotic motives. They cannot desire that the Government and the representatives of the people should be brought into the risk of daily collision, by *personal* legislation on the one hand, and the determination to resist injustice and oppression on the other. Parliament in the United Province will have greater things to do. It is

rising into the dignity of almost a national Legislature. If it opposes Government, it will be Government as a whole, accountable for all its acts by whomsoever they are advised or performed, and true reformers will be the last to wish that Parliament should usurp the details of public business, or relieve the Government from the responsibility of conducting them.

To those who have hitherto adhered to the strict rule of the Pharisees, who have looked upon it as a kind of rebellion boldly to impugn the proceedings of Government, but who, now that the Government is professedly liberal, are ready to court popular favour, and to create an opposition on this question, we have little to say. Their power is little, their motives are little, and they cannot help the Government in any way so effectually as by taking up and advocating what they are pleased to consider reform principles.

The allusion to this class of politicians brings to our mind another point upon which they have a most hankering desire to make themselves popular, that is to say, the necessity imposed by the Act of Union for grants of money being asked by the Government. No argument is more likely to seize upon a mind uninstructed in the principles of responsible government, but inclined to uphold popular immunities, than the one used in this case. They say the money belongs to the people, and the representatives of the people should dispose of it. But let the point be gravely considered. Here we have a people desirous that a *Government* should manage the public business in accordance with the popular will: a Government supposed to be, and which ought to be, intimately acquainted with the extent of public resources and public credit. It is expected to be accountable for the use of that credit and of these resources; but how certainly is it relieved from all such responsibility by the system of money grants unasked by the Executive. In England, if an expenditure is thought to be required, the Minister is asked, by the party interested, to advise Her Majesty to bring it before Parliament. If he will not, he must defend himself and his Government for not doing so; but no man dreams of moving for the grant without the sanction of Government. If the army be reduced too much, or the building of ships and the maintenance of the navy neglected, Ministers are called to account, and threatened with impeachment because *they do not* ask for money: but who ever