

(3) He accepted the desirability of bringing the Indians along where this proved possible and recognized this as a prime concern of Canadian delegation;

(4) He also did not expect the ICSC to come up with a watertight case in respect of infractions;

(5) Nevertheless, he thought ICSC (by implication, the Canadian-Indian majority, or at least the Canadian delegation) could in many cases have acted more effectively in publicizing the true state of affairs in Vietnam. He referred particularly to the blatant Soviet infractions of the ceasefire agreement in the use of Hanoi (Gia Lam) Airport to supply the rebels in Laos.

(6) In his view, the most helpful role the ICSC could play would be to alert public opinion to Communist violations. He referred in this connection to USA desire to get ICSC established in Laos with full freedom of movement and no limitations as to quorum, etc., so that if, as he hoped, the Soviet Union engaged in a commitment not to allow Hanoi to use Laos as a corridor for infiltration into South Vietnam, there would be machinery at hand to expose any Soviet dereliction. It was for this reason United States representatives at the current Geneva Conference would press for the wider and more rapid publication and circulation of ICSC (Laos) reports;

(7) He did not deny that the South Vietnam government had to some extent been unco-operative, although he did ask for specific instances of it; and he also readily conceded that the Diem régime was not, in general, unblemished;

(8) He was appreciative of Canadian co-operative intentions and thought local liaison with United States representatives in Saigon had been satisfactory. He would let us know if additional liaison (e.g., in Washington) were thought useful.

2. Johnson was quite unconcerned about Indian sensitivity (perhaps understandably) but he said nothing to indicate whether broad Indian objectives in Southeast Asia were at all reasonable or in accord with United States policy for, e.g., Laos and Cambodia. He also apparently failed to grasp the suggestion that the purposes of the ICSC in Laos related first of all to that country rather than to Vietnam. Finally, he offered little response to the suggestion that the prospects for arranging the initial re-establishment of the ICSC in Laos might well have been prejudiced by active condemnation of the Gia Lam infractions by an Indian-Canadian majority of the ICSC in Vietnam. (The State Department was, of course, at that time rather hopeful that a neutral nations commission might supplant the ICSC for Laos.)

E.R. R[ETTIE]

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*Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
pour le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

CONFIDENTIAL

[Ottawa], October 23, 1961

\* VIETNAM — MURDER OF COL. NAM

On October 1, Col. Hoang Thuy Nam, Chief of the Vietnamese Liaison Mission to the International Commission, was captured by an armed band while on a visit to his farm near Saigon. The Liaison Mission informed the Commission of this incident and asked it to order Col. Nam's release. Mr. Woodsworth attempted to have the Commission send a letter in reply, or at least to make some official statement on the case. The Polish Commissioner refused to agree to the Commission doing anything at all, and the Indian Alternate Delegate, although in