

other Time would have been warmly embraced, it is sufficiently clear *Maestricht* was intended as the finishing Stroke of the War, and the Inducement to recommend a Peace previously concerted; for, when the Enemy's Army had recovered themselves again from this apparent Danger, and the Siege pushed on to a certain Point, that made the taking of it soon unquestionable, then was the Cue given, and the Preliminaries signed. This considered, without the previous attendant Circumstances, puts it out of Doubt that a Peace was determined upon; but why, or for what particular Reason, does not as yet appear, except that Supposition takes Place, that we could not afford to carry on the War any longer: But in this our Helmsmen seemed to act like peevish Gamesters, who forfeit the Chance of winning, by inconsiderately throwing up their Cards. We perhaps judged worse of our own Situation, and better of the Enemy's, than was in Reality the Fact, or else it would have been of little Significance what Acquisitions the *French* could possibly make, when the Allies were ripening daily into Confidence with each other, and the *Dutch* Troops forming for Service; which, to all that were acquainted with the Part they acted before, was a considerable Augmentation of the Strength of the Union; and therefore, supposing that the taking of *Maestricht* could not have been prevented, it is more than probable that the Enemy would not have been able to have made farther Acquisitions. It was presumed at this Time, and from the best Authority, that the Allies had in the Field, including