

serious mutiny had broken out in the garrison at Louisbourg, which had lasted all winter. This was known in New England, where it was believed that the garrison would refuse to fight, and that, therefore, the fort would yield on the first summons. But Duchambon, on the first appearance of the fleet, called the soldiers together, and made a stirring speech to them, pointing out the splendid opportunity the invasion gave them of wiping out the offences of the winter, by returning loyally to their duty as soldiers, and manfully fighting the enemies of their king and country.

The soldiers responded at once to the appeal, returned to their duty, and proved loyal to their flag throughout the siege. Still, however, the officers continued to mistrust them, and did not feel safe in allowing the men to sally forth against the enemy in the trenches. Sallies, from time to time, by veteran soldiers against raw recruits, at work in dangerous services, quite new to them, could not have failed of some success, and would, certainly, have retarded the progress of the besiegers. The conduct of the garrison during the siege leaves no room to suppose they could not have been trusted beyond the walls, but the fear of the officers, in effect, allowed the siege operations to be carried on without interruption, except so far as they were obstructed by cannonades from the fort. If, therefore, the besiegers did not derive benefit, in the form they expected, from the disaffection of the garrison, they had ample compensation for it in a form they did not count upon.

We think, therefore, we have made it clear that the success of the New England expedition, if not miraculous, was, at all events, accompanied by a series of happy occurrences, which no sagacity could have foreseen. The result of the expedition had, we believe, much to do with shaping the future of this continent. Had it failed, it would have entailed disastrous results on all the British provinces. In that case, posterity would have denounced it as a mad adventure. But nothing succeeds like success. On the strength of the result, Old England went wild. Nor was New England less ecstatic in its joy. The provincials felt themselves no longer on a plane inferior to that of Englishmen. They rose in their own estimation. They began to feel that in vigor and pluck, in hardihood and energy, they were quite the equal of the English, and they knew that in education and intelligence, and in the peculiarly American quality of versatility, they possessed a marked superiority over their English brethren. They felt that they might rely in the future on the same measure of success which had attended their first great enterprise. Therefore, though for the time their warlike exploit was ineffective, the British having, at the close of the war, ignominiously handed back Louisbourg to the French, still the provincials cherished the memory of the siege, and of its incidents, and were ready for like exploits when the occasion should offer. We have little doubt that the spirit, thus created, fostered by subsequent warlike exploits in company with English troops, was a powerful factor in shaping the future destiny of the continent.

The first siege of Louisbourg naturally suggested the second, in which imperial and colonial forces were again mingled. The second capture of the Cape Breton stronghold, in 1758, naturally led to the siege of Quebec in the following year, and the fall of that great fortress was the end of French power in America.

So long as the provinces needed the aid of England to repel French aggression, the English monarch could count on the allegiance of his colonial subjects. But when these no longer needed imperial assistance, the warlike spirit, bred of participation in contests