

guarantees before parliament endorse the means of financing those games?

Right Hon. P. E. Trudeau (Prime Minister): Mr. Speaker, I indicated to parliament last week—and the situation is still the same at this time—that we could not introduce in the House an amendment to the legislation before we have more than verbal guarantees that the deficit, if any, should not be assumed by the Canadian taxpayer. This is still the position of the government and it is also the wish of Mr. Drapeau who right from the outset assured Canadian taxpayers that they would not have to pay anything since Montreal benefited in 1967 of millions of dollars for Expo 67 and because of this attitude of both Mr. Drapeau and ourselves we are simply waiting for some valid assurance not only from a political point of view but from a legal point of view that the Canadian taxpayer will not be the backer in the final analysis.

We are still waiting for that assurance and I think the Quebec government and the Montreal administration are presently working on it.

[English]

Mr. Steven E. Paproski (Edmonton Centre): Mr. Speaker, I have one further supplementary question for the Prime Minister. Will he stop playing games and advise the House how much money he plans to give to the 1976 Olympics?

Some hon. Members: Oh, oh!

Mr. Paproski: Why are you so tough on Montreal?

Mr. Speaker: Order, please. The hon. member will appreciate that his question as asked is somewhat irregular.

Some hon. Members: Oh, oh!

Mr. Speaker: Order, please. Will hon. members kindly resume their seats.

[Translation]

I simply want to indicate that we have reached the end of the question period. Obviously, if we are to continue on this interesting subject we will have to do it during the question period tomorrow.

GOVERNMENT ORDERS

[English]

CRIMINAL CODE

REINSTATEMENT OF LAW RELATING TO CAPITAL PUNISHMENT THAT EXISTED PRIOR TO DECEMBER 30, 1972

The House resumed from Tuesday, January 30, 1973, consideration of the motion of Mr. Allmand that Bill C-2, 25714—53½

Capital Punishment

to amend the Criminal Code, be read the second time and referred to the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs.

Mr. Donald W. Munro (Esquimalt-Saanich): Mr. Speaker, when I called it ten o'clock last evening I was in the midst of listing a number of failures of the government to respond to what the electorate was asking during the past election campaign. My catalogue had not been terminated. We now have before us a bill asking for a moratorium on the death penalty. This, I submit, is in no way an answer to what the electorate asked during the past election campaign. The people were not asking for another moratorium; they certainly were not asking for perpetuation of the situation in which the criminal commits and the cabinet commutes. That is not law and order; it is not respect for the law.

We have heard a lot in this debate about deterrence. I wish to talk about it myself although my case for retention is not based only on deterrence. In this connection I submit that the very need for written law with its penalties and punishment presupposes an imperfect society. These imperfections or readiness to disregard the law are themselves graded in seriousness from jaywalking, through embezzlement and fraud to the commission of the most heinous of all crimes, murder. To each of these acts of lawlessness, be they slight or serious, is attached a progressively stringent punishment. Does it not follow from this—that is, the recognition of graded crimes alongside their appropriately graded punishments—that there is a deterrent relationship between the assigned punishment and the misdemeanour of crime? If it does not, I am seriously puzzled.

Are punishments deterrents? If not, what are they? Is the threat of having your driver's licence removed not a deterrent to exceeding the speed limit or driving while under the influence of alcohol or a drug? If this is a deterrent, why consider that other, more grievous punishments are not? In short, I find it difficult to follow those who are against the death penalty on the ground that it is no deterrent. There may be no statistical evidence to prove that it is a deterrent: those who were deterred from committing murder will not come forward and say so. Our evidence, therefore, is faulty; but that is no excuse for having faulty logic.

Furthermore, some are claiming, basing themselves on recent Canadian experience, that the death penalty has shown itself to be no deterrent. How can we draw any such inference when the death penalty has not been carried out because of cabinet decision since, I think, 1961 and certainly not since the moratorium? It has invariably been commuted. No statistics on the deterrent value of the death penalty for this period are, therefore, available. What do we really know, in such circumstances, about the deterrent effect of the death penalty in Canada.