

articles in the press of both sides. No names were named, but it was clear that when the Chinese denounced "revisionists" they had the Soviet Union in mind and that Soviet attacks on "left sectarians" were aimed directly at the Chinese. This very serious quarrel was concerned with the means by which the non-Communist world should be communized. The Chinese put the emphasis on struggle, including military struggle involving the risk of war, and they insisted that to compromise or improve relations with the capitalist world was a betrayal of Communism. The Russians, on the other hand, convinced that nuclear war would be a disaster and confident in the strength of their economy and in the appeal of their social example, put their emphasis on the possibility of bringing about the defeat of the West by means short of war.

Both factors mentioned above—the improbability of reaching agreement and the Soviet-Chinese quarrel—may have lessened the Soviet Government's enthusiasm for a summit meeting. This is not to say that these two circumstances of themselves were enough to cause them to break up the meeting. The convening of such a meeting had been a consistent aim of Soviet policy for at least two years, and they were almost certainly willing to go ahead with it despite the slim chances of getting their way and despite the disapprobation of the Chinese.

There then occurred events that led the Soviet Government abruptly to reverse its policy: the flight of the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft and the capture of its pilot, the Soviet decision to publicize these occurrences and the United States reaction to the publicity. It is not hard to understand why the Russians reacted sharply to the U-2 incident: they sought to end a system of gathering intelligence that had been of great value to the United States, to brand the United States an "aggressor", and to proclaim the effectiveness of their rocket defences. Official United States acknowledgment of responsibility for the flight and the Presidential justification of it may have finally decided Mr. Khrushchov to break up the summit conference by imposing unacceptable conditions for his attendance.

### After the Summit Failure

The task for Soviet policy after the summit failure was to suspend consideration of the main international problems—the Berlin situation and disarmament—until the breach with the Chinese could be healed at least superficially and until there was a new United States Government. Mr. Khrushchov had, in short, committed himself not to deal with President Eisenhower. At the same time, it was important for the Soviet Union not to appear reluctant to negotiate solutions to these problems. Mr. Khrushchov briskly set about this complicated task. He went direct from Paris, after the summit failure, to East Berlin, where he greatly disappointed his East German hosts by deferring action on the Berlin question. Soon after, in June, he summoned a meeting of Communist parties in Bucharest, where a Congress of the Roumanian Communist Party provided an occasion, and tried to rally world Communist support for his side of the argument with the Chinese. The Chinese refused to budge and, presumably as a direct result of this failure, two days after the end of the Bucharest meeting Mr. Khrushchov withdrew the Soviet-bloc representatives from the ten-power disarmament negotiations in Geneva.