

system allows countries to take advantage of the IAEA's considerable experience in this area, as well as to save costs, the IAEA system does not cover all verification functions required by NWFZs. The IAEA safeguards system is geared to ensuring that non-nuclear weapon states do not divert nuclear material to build nuclear explosives. It does not monitor other possible violations of a NWFZ, such as clandestine import of nuclear weapons by a party, or the use of territory within the zone by an extra-regional country for the manufacturing or testing of nuclear weapons.⁹ Thus, the scope of the verification regimes of NWFZs goes beyond the full application of IAEA safeguards.

Regional control mechanisms created by NWFZs, such as the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL), the Consultative Committee of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, the Commission for the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free zone and its subsidiary organ, the Executive Committee, and the African Commission on Nuclear Energy, not only oversee and review the application of the IAEA safeguards system (including challenge inspections authorized by them, but carried out by IAEA inspectors) within their respective zones, but also provide for a number of additional control measures. Thus, in addition to the application of the IAEA system, the Latin American Treaty provides for reports and exchanges of information, and special reports requested by OPANAL. A provision for special inspections contained in the original draft of the Latin American Treaty has been removed as a result of amendments proposed by Brazil and Argentina. The South Pacific zone's verification regime includes, in addition to IAEA safeguards, reports and information exchange, consultations, and a complaints procedure.¹⁰ The latter provides for special inspections using IAEA inspectors requested by any party and authorized by a Consultative Committee, the main regional verification body established by the Treaty. The Southeast Asian zone also supplements the IAEA safeguards system with report and exchange of information, requests for clarification, fact-finding missions, and a dispute settlement procedure. The Commission for the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone is responsible for overseeing the implementation of the Treaty and ensuring compliance with its provisions, while the Executive Committee is responsible for ensuring the proper operation of verification measures, including requests for clarification and fact-finding missions. In the African zone, the control system supervised by the African Commission on Nuclear Energy includes the application of the IAEA safeguards system, as well as a regional system of report and exchange of information, consultations and conferences. The African Treaty also provides for a complaints and dispute settlement mechanism, including technical visits and special inspections using IAEA inspectors.

It should be noted that so far there have been no reported case of special inspections carried out by the IAEA at the request of any of the four regional control bodies. This may have do with the relative newness of the Southeast Asian and the African NWFZs, as well as the absence of any serious effort by countries located within all the four zones to acquire nuclear weapons. In general, the regional control mechanisms rely on the IAEA to carry out the technical aspects of verification, (thereby having no need to develop the technical expertise themselves), while retaining political control over the verification process. But this