

for Bosnia, and the US effort to equip the Ghanaian battalion in Rwanda both serve as models. One idea worthy of closer study is for industrialised armies with hi-tech capabilities to twin themselves permanently with one or two developing countries which they would equip and help train.

UN personnel have long experience in coping with frustrations arising from non-cooperation by parties on the ground. Nevertheless, a weak point of much recent work on **peace-keeping doctrine**, one which crops up both in the splendid new UK doctrine of Wider Peacekeeping and in the US Army Field Manual, is the constant emphasis placed on consent as a sine qua non for peacekeeping. A problem arising particularly in inter-communal strife and other forms of civil conflict is that parties on the ground which have provided general consent for the UN's presence and role can often withdraw this consent for specific UN activities or more broadly. At this point, the UN is stuck, and it is at this point that use of force (e.g. air-strikes in Bosnia) will have to remain an option at the Council's disposal.

Finally, there is the important issue of the **security of UN personnel** when engaged in risky PKOs. A convention on the safety of UN personnel was negotiated in 1994. However, the convention, although a useful tool in itself, does not address the anxieties of Member States over placing their nationals at risk; this is particularly true for the US, which increasingly seems to expect to conduct casualty-free wars. These concerns can be addressed effectively in the field only with an agreed and clear common framework of command and control procedures. Without these, PKOs will inevitably fall apart, as did UNOSOM II in Somalia in 1993. Nevertheless, even in situations where the UN chain of command prevails, governments have proved themselves highly vulnerable to public opinion's concerns over the safety of military personnel serving abroad and have sought to influence Secretariat decisions on the use of their troops.

Some Lessons of Recent Peacekeeping Experience

The UN's role in **prevention of conflict** deserves more emphasis. The Secretary-General of the UN, both directly and through his special representatives and envoys, is routinely involved in much quiet mediation and preventive diplomacy, for example over East Timor. When these efforts fail, as they sometimes do in spite of the best efforts of the Secretary-General, and hostilities break out, recent experience demonstrates that it is both expensive and difficult for the UN to attempt to make peace between combatants. Much more effective, and economical, would be more substantial preventive measures, including preventive deployments of peacekeepers as has been the case in Macedonia. Canada has urged the reinforcement of the UN's capacity for rapid deployment of sizeable numbers of personnel. The availability of such a capacity in 1994 might have prevented the worst of the genocide in Rwanda.²⁷

²⁷ As a result of these proposals, over two dozen countries are currently working in New York on concrete measures to enhance the UN's capacity for rapid reaction. Much of the work is focused on the creation of a small (50 or so) and highly mobile permanent UN operational-level military HQ which could deploy to the field within 72 hours as the vanguard and nerve-centre prior to deployment of larger forces. The groundwork for these