

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

would jeopardize the whole effort to achieve an effective verification regime. Its purpose must be to deter violations of the convention rather than requests for inspections.

The terminology is of course less important than the substance of the matter under negotiation. The Swedish delegation will therefore not insist on the term "inspections on request", if this would hamper further progress on this article.

Sweden welcomes the fact that the presentation of CD/CW/WP.352 has now again brought article IX to the negotiating table. We particularly welcome the amendments proposed by the delegation of France. Together with previous documents, including CD/CW/WP.316, these contributions form a good basis for the work on article IX. The conclusion of that work is, in the view of my delegation, the most urgent task of the Ad Hoc Committee.

The trend in the field of disarmament during the last few years has been to work towards greater transparency and openness as well as greater intrusiveness in terms of verification regimes and clarification of doubts about compliance. This is an important trend that inspires confidence and thereby promotes the security of States. It is on the basis of this trend, as well as of the need to create an effective "safety net" in the verification regime, that my delegation has approached article IX of the draft convention.

It is important to keep in mind that the work on a verification regime containing, among other important parts, inspections on request does not have a bearing on the chemical weapons convention only. It will also form the framework for the elaboration of verification regimes in other future multilateral treaties on arms limitation and disarmament.

In the opinion of my delegation it is of the utmost importance that a request for an inspection be complied with by the technical secretariat automatically and without delay. Time is of the essence. A phased approach might be a way to take care, at least to a degree, of both the demand for automaticity and the concern regarding possible abuse. A time-consuming process, hampering the start of the inspection, could erode the credibility of the convention. Besides, it is likely that the executive council will closely follow the entire process of an inspection on request and thus play a significant role in deterring abuse of the convention.

Most countries have military installations which are of the highest importance to their national security. Sweden therefore favours a procedure which makes it possible for a State party to protect its national security without giving it the right of denying access to the facility in question. Managed access offers an acceptable way of dealing with these problems. In the view of my delegation, the more restricted access approach contained in CD/CW/WP.352 gives too much freedom to the inspected State party. It may be added that the need for a strict verification regime seems vindicated by recent events.