

particular saw the CPD as a practicable proposition which, through the implementation of the consensus principle and the mounting of political pressure by the Third World majority, could serve as a medium for exacting arms control concessions from the North. This majority had come increasingly to harbour strong doubts about the strategic logic of mutual nuclear deterrence and its arms control handmaiden, the SALT exercise, as instruments of military stability. As Louis René Beres put it tersely, "the objectives of SALT and the SSOD were far from congruent."¹¹

Both the SSOD exercise and the reformations at Geneva were strongly resisted by the United States and the Soviet Union, who interpreted these exercises as untoward interference in their ongoing bilateral arms control dialogues. Both superpowers explicitly opposed the injection of nuclear disarmament discussions into the CD agenda, and there is no evidence that either gave serious consideration to the effect that the elimination of this class of weaponry would have on their security. To the extent that strategic doctrine and force posture informed the substance of the bilateral arms control dialogues, a principal aim of Soviet and American negotiators was the accommodation of existing and new weapons programmes which they felt would strengthen strategic stability. Wide-ranging prohibitions on stabilizing weapons and weapons systems were thus seen as inimical to the aims of strategic arms control. For the United States in particular, both the call for a CPD and the Geneva reforms increased its sense of isolation from the Third World UN majority and from arms control multilateralism. A historic superpower wariness of involving the Geneva forum in the bilateral arms control process was thereby heightened.

The post-UNSSOD I environment at Geneva also witnessed the emergence of rather fundamental differences between its non-nuclear members, about the existing international military order in general and about the strategy of nuclear deterrence as its central element. These differences were largely along Western and non-aligned group lines, and

¹¹ Louis René Beres, *Apocalypse - Nuclear Catastrophe and World Politics*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980, p. 211.