

achievements" (CCD/PV.776).

2. Cut-off of the production of nuclear fissionable materials for weapon purposes

Another realistic step to be considered by the CCD in arresting the nuclear arms race would be the cut-off of the production of nuclear fissionable materials for weapon purposes. Japan has promoted this idea ever since 1969. I should like to take this opportunity to urge the nuclear-weapon States to halt the production of nuclear fissionable materials for weapon purposes as the first step towards the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons to be undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States in the near future. I also urge the United States and the Soviet Union to start, promptly, exploratory talks on this question. In order to assure compliance with such measures, the nuclear-weapon States should accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards similar to those which are applied to the non-nuclear-weapon States under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and other international agreements.

II. Ban on chemical weapons (CWB)

Next, my delegation would like to make a statement on the question of banning chemical weapons, to which priority is given in the field of non-nuclear disarmament.

There are many kinds of chemical weapons, all of which are weapons of mass destruction. A country that reaches a certain level in its chemical industry and technology is able to produce chemical weapons relatively easily, cheaply and secretly on any scale it likes. As there are countries which have incorporated chemical weapons in their weapons systems since World War I, no agreement has been made during the past ten years of deliberations at the CCD, though a consensus has been reached about the necessity of a treaty banning chemical weapons.

My delegation understands that the pending issues of the CWB question are: (1) the scope of chemical warfare agents to be banned, and (2) verification.

With regard to the scope of chemical warfare agents to be banned, my delegation, which frequently presents working documents to the CCD (CCD/420, 483, 515 and 529), has made efforts to make the scope of agents to be banned as clear as possible by listing those agents to be banned.

Judging from the recent deliberations of the CCD and the progress report of 5 May 1978 on the United States-USSR CW negotiations, the following appear to be the main thoughts on how the question of banning chemical weapons should be treated.

1. All chemical warfare agents to be banned should be divided into three categories, namely (a) "single-purpose agents" — used solely for warfare purposes; (b) "dual-purpose agents" — used for both warfare and peaceful purposes, and (c) the precursors.
2. Those chemical warfare agents to be banned should be all lethal chemical agents, including incapacitating agents. Their scope should be specified by a general-purpose criterion supplemented by a toxicity criterion.
3. The agents to be banned should include precursors and should exclude agents for riot control, such as tear gases.
4. The enumeration of chemical warfare agents to be banned cannot be exhaustive, but it is desirable that they should be amply illustrated in a positive or a negative list.
5. All lethal chemical warfare agents should be banned, both as regards their production and stockpiling. The destruction of existing stockpiles in arsenals should be carried out step by step.
6. Any CW treaty should not obtrude upon chemical industry activities for peaceful purposes.

As for verification, the issues pending are:

1. Verification of procedures for destroying CW stockpiles.
2. Ensuring that a closed CW production factory is not reopened.

It may, however, be observed that detailed technical problems on verification remain unsolved, but according to the wording documents which have been presented by many