

the security of the West depends. Our manpower, national resources and industry remain fully committed to the defense of Western democracy, as we have proved in two world wars at a cost of over 100,000 Canadian dead.

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Yet, it is in the area of military capability that our power has been most markedly in decline. We emerged from the Second World War a major military power, with an army of half a million soldiers, a navy of 200 ships, and an airforce comparable to that of Britain. After the war, we set a definite upper limit on our military capability when we ruled ourselves out of the nuclear club, and in the mid-1960s our conventional military power began a steady decline — in respect of both personnel and equipment. (See Figure 13.)

Figure 13: DEFENCE FORCES AND EXPENDITURES AMONG NATO COUNTRIES

DEFENCE FORCES AND EXPENDITURES AMONG NATO COUNTRIES				
COUNTRY	ARMED FORCES (000)	\$ MILLION (1984)	% GNP (1982)	PER CAPITA (1984)
Belgium	93.6	2,892	3.4	260
Canada	82.9	6,182	2.1	282
Denmark*	31.4	1,400	2.5	237
France	471.4	22,522	4.2	371
Germany, Fed Rep	495.0	28,453	4.1	436
Greece*	178.0	2,639	7.0	237
Iceland	0	0	0	0
Italy	375.1	9,090	2.6	(83) 177
Luxembourg	0.7	41	1.2	(83) 117
Netherlands	101.9	4,464	3.3	293
Norway	36.8	1,698	3.0	345
Portugal	63.5	803	3.4	(83) 70
Spain	330.0	4,529	2.5	(83) 87
Turkey	602.0	2,755	5.2	59
United Kingdom	395.0	24,296	5.3	436
United States	2,135.9	196,345	6.5	1,011

\*1983 figures

Source: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*, various years. *Canada's Maritime Defence*, Report of the Sub-Committee on National Defence of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, May 1983.

The decline has been most notable in the resources available for surveillance of Canadian air-space and sea approaches, during a period when the security sensitivity of these areas was regarded as relatively low. This assessment has now changed. While air defense capabilities will improve in the next few years, without new policy direction, the capability of Canada's surface maritime forces will continue to decrease until well into the 1990's, even assuming an extension of the Canadian Patrol Frigate (CPF) program. (See Figures 14 and 15.)