

Hobhouse, in his "Theory of Knowledge." Both thinkers recognize that things-in-themselves out of all relation to sentient organisms, are undoubtedly *Undinge*. Of Riehl's Monism there can be little uncertainty, after a reading of the concluding volume of the *Kriticismus*.

In explaining and defending his own view that "there is immediate knowledge of independent reality in normal perception," and that this renders mediate knowledge, through processes of thought, of the same reality possible, Mr. Macintosh introduces a creative psychical activity, which he consents "to call once more a soul" (without giving a definition), and which appears to us to do more for the author than physiological psychology will vouch for. For while he is anxious that it should not suggest anything ambiguous or mystical, as Bergson's use of consciousness and creative activity does, it yet creates the secondary qualities and thereby renders possible a revelation of the independently existing primary qualities. It is not possible to find in the volume a convincing argument for the startling doctrine that secondary qualities, such as colours, sounds and tastes, are wholly produced by consciousness, which appears to many to be a relational function rather than an entity. Indeed, the author experiences a difficulty in answer to a supposed objection in this connection from the side of subjectivism, which might urge, why should not human psychical creativity be able to furnish an explanation of the primary qualities also? Chap. XIV. Further, he does not seem to have sufficiently considered the question, whether his interpretation of consciousness would not entail a Metaphysical Dualism. What is the source of the psychical activity?

Emphasis of the factor of activistic consciousness in knowledge leads Mr. Macintosh in two succeeding chapters (XV, XVI), one of them entitled "The Genesis of the a priori," to a recognition of the strong as well as of the weak aspects of rationalistic theories, including the Epistemology of Kant, to whom he hardly does justice. The motive of the adoption of an activistic Empiricism seems to lie in the desire to give his Realism a pragmatist coloring and interpretation, from which it apparently gains nothing. It comes out clearly in the second part of the volume, in which, after a critique of Intellectualism, as represented, among others, by F. H. Bradley, Bosanquet and Bertrand Russell, and of its opposite as represented by the Pragmatists and Bergson, the discussion is brought to a close in two chapters on Critical Monism in Logical Theory and in Scientific Method, respectively.

Having discarded several kinds of current Pragmatism which appear unsatisfactory, the author defends a "representational Pragmatism," which is defined very carefully (pp. 444 to 446). Difficulties present themselves in its application, in particular with the terms *practically* and *purposes*. A decision cannot be attempted here as to how far the author can be regarded as having successfully coped with the problem of a criterion of