

or to avoid dishonour, or to extricate himself from a maze of difficulties he could not brave or bear, he rashly flew from "the ill he had," to others and more grievous ones "he knew not of." I think the course he took unaccountable on any other supposition but this, that he was temporarily insane.

It remains only that I should ask your prayers for the Church while she suffers from one of those offences which we know must needs come, for the Bishop in his filiation as a parent, for this young man in his mad outbreak or his sin, and for myself on this new experience of peril among false brethren.

To those of you who know my doctrine, manner of life, and character, from the first day I came among you until now, I am sure I need make no professions of my unshaking faith in the One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic Church, and in the Protestant Episcopal branch of it in America.

The unkind censures this may give rise to, and "the evil surmises of men of corrupt minds," if they reach me, I must bear as part of my cross and ministerial burden. But the charitable judgements of those who may see anything in my course in this connection which is wrong, though I am quite un-averse to it, I shall accept in a spirit of meekness, and seek to profit by it.

News Department.

From Papers by R. M. S. Canada, September 29.

MARSHAL PELISSIER'S DESPATCH.

Head Quarters at Sebastopol, Sept. 11.—M. le Maréchal—Since the 16th of August, the day of the battle of the Tchernaya, and notwithstanding repeated warnings of a new and more formidable attack by the enemy against the positions which we occupy on the river, every preparation was made to deliver a decisive assault against Sebastopol itself. The artillery of the right attack commenced on the 17th of August a well-sustained fire against the Malakoff, the Little Redan, the neighboring defences, and the roads, in order to permit our engineers to establish defences close to the place, from which the troops might be able instantly to throw themselves upon the *enceinte*. Our engineers besides prepared materials for emplacements, and on the 17th of Sept. all batteries of the left opened a very violent fire against the town. The English on their side kept up a hot cannonade against the Great Redan and its redoubts, which they were to attack. All being ready, I resolved, in concert with General Simpson, to give the assault on the 8th of Sept. at the hour of noon. General M'Mahon's Division was to carry the works of the Malakoff, General Dulac's Division was to attack the Little Redan, and in the centre the Division of General La Motterouge was to march against the curtain connecting these two extreme points. Besides these troops, I had given to General Bosquet General Mellinet's Division of the Guards, to support the first three divisions. Thus far for the right. In the centre the English were to attack the Great Redan, ascending it at its salient. On the left the 1st Corps, to which General de la Marmora had wished to join a Sardinian brigade, having at its head General Levaillant's division, was to penetrate into the interior of the town by the Central Bastion, and also to turn the Flagstaff Bastion in order to establish a lodgment there likewise. General de Salles had instructions not to pursue his attack farther than circumstances might render it advisable. Further, the fleets of Admirals Lyons and Bruat were to operate a powerful diversion by firing against the Quarantine, the Roadstead, and the sea front of the fortress; but the state of the sea, agitated by a violent north-west wind, was such that neither the line-of-battle ships nor the frigates were able to quit their anchorage. The English and French mortar-boats, however, were able to go into action. Their fire was of remarkable excellence, and they rendered us great assistance. At noon exactly the divisions of Generals M'Mahon, La Motterouge, and Dulac, electrified by their chiefs, sprang to the Malakoff, the Curtain, and the Little Redan of the Carenage. After unexampled difficulties, and a most exciting foot-to-foot combat, General M'Mahon's division succeeded in effecting a lodgment in the interior part of the Malakoff. The enemy showered down a storm of projectiles upon our brave troops. The Redan of the Carenage, especially battered by the *maitron en croix* and the steamers, it was necessary to evacuate after its occupation; but the division of General La Motterouge made its ground good on one part of the curtain, and that of General M'Mahon gained continually the reserves which I sent forward to him. The other attacks were subordinate to that of the Malakoff, that being the capital point of the defences

of the whole place. Standing in the Brandon Redoubt (on the Malakoff) I considered that the Malakoff was safely in our power, and I gave the signal which had been agreed upon with General Simpson. The English immediately advanced bravely against the salient of the Great Redan. They were able to effect a lodgment in it, and struggled a considerable time to maintain their position, but, crushed by the Russian reserves, which advanced incessantly, and by a violent fire of artillery, they were forced to retreat into their parallel. At the same moment General de Salles had directed an attack against the Central Bastion. The Levaillant Division had begun to establish itself in it, as well as in the Right Lunette; a tremendous fire of grape was succeeded by the arrival of Russian reinforcements so considerable in number, that our troops, already decimated by the fire of the enemy, and whose chiefs had been disabled, were compelled to fall back into the place whence they had sallied. Convinced that the taking of the Malakoff would be decisive of success, I prevented the renewal of any attacks on other points, which, by compelling the hostile army to remain on all its points, had already attained their main object. I then directed my sole attention to the retaining possession of the Malakoff which General M'Mahon had been previously enabled completely to obtain. Besides, a great and critical moment was impending. General Bosquet had been struck by the bursting of a shell, and his command I gave to General Dulac. A powder magazine near the Malakoff exploded at this moment, from which contingency I anticipated the most serious results. The Russians, hoping to profit by this accident, immediately advanced in dense masses, and, disposed in three columns, simultaneously attacked the centre, the left and the right of the Malakoff. But measures of defence had already been taken in the interior of the fortress; for which purpose General M'Mahon opposed to the enemy bodies of undaunted troops, whom nothing could intimidate; and after the most desperate efforts the Russians were compelled to make a precipitate retreat. From that moment the discomfited enemy appears to have renounced all idea of further attack. The Malakoff was ours, and no effort of the enemy could wreat it from us. It was half-past four o'clock. Measures were immediately taken for enabling us to repulse the enemy, in case he should attempt against us a nocturnal attack. But we were soon released from our uncertainty. As soon as it became night, fires burst forth on every side, mines exploded, magazines of gunpowder exploded in the air. The sight of Sebastopol in flames, which the whole army contemplated, was one of the most awe-inspiring and sinister pictures that the history of war can have presented. The enemy was making a complete evacuation; it was effected during the night by means of a bridge constructed between the two shores of the roadstead, and under cover of successive explosions that prevented me from approaching and harassing him. On the morning of the 9th the whole southern side of the town was freed, and in our power. I have no need of enhancing in the eyes of your Excellency the importance of so great a success. Neither will it be necessary for me to speak of this brave army, whose warlike virtues and devotion are so thoroughly appreciated by our Emperor; and I have, great as the number is, to name to you those who have distinguished themselves among so many valiant soldiers. I cannot yet do so, but I shall fulfil this duty in one of my next despatches. Deign to accept, Monsieur le Maréchal, the expression of my respectful devotion. The General-in-Chief, PELISSIER.

FAILURE AT THE REDAN.

The causes of our failure were not inadequate means at our disposal for carrying the Redan, but mismanagement of these means was the root of the evil. The men of the Light and Second Divisions ought not to have been selected for leading the charge; these divisions have been cut up more than any other, and the consequence is that raw recruits and inexperienced officers outnumber the soldiers and officers who have served for some time in the regiments of those divisions. Another blunder was the picking out of certain companies in each regiment to form the storming parties, instead of having these parties composed of entire regiments. The result of such an arrangement was this, that there was no principle of concert amongst them, and under the heavy fire of the enemy they went to pieces in a short time, and it became at once hopeless and impossible to reunite them.

A serious error was also committed in limiting the attack to the front of the Redan; it ought to have embraced the angles of the position also, for the enemy's troops occupying the angles poured down a most destructive fire upon the flank of our ascending parous-

Had other bodies of our men been made to move up against these points, this would not only have diverted part of the fire of the fort from our men, but these parties might have been able to have penetrated into the Redan, and the Russians defending the front might have become enclosed, as it were, within a circle of our men, who could then have destroyed them, or at least compelled them to fall back. Not less culpable was the want of preparations to repair on the moment such a heavy repulse. This was a disaster that should have been provided for as much as if it had been foreseen.

The reserves were so placed as not to be immediately available. Had fresh troops been at hand when our men were falling back on their trenches, they might have pushed forward, taking along with them at least a part of the soldiers then retreating, renewed the attack on the Redan, and a different issue might have been the consequence. A footing might have been obtained, and successive bodies of fresh troops being poured in, would have probably turned the tide of victory in our favour.—*Corresp. of London Guardian.*

Mr. Wood continues, in the *Herald*, his reason why he believes nothing more will be done this season in the Crimea. Troops may be landed at Eupatoria or Kalamita Bay with a view of cutting off the supplies to Prince Gortschakoff, but the following difficulties arise:—

"The first and the most formidable obstacle to the landing at Eupatoria would be the almost total want of water. From my knowledge of that part of the Crimea, I much doubt if there would be sufficient water found even for half the troops necessary. For any force of cavalry, or for the baggage animals which would be imperatively necessary to an army marching against Simpheropol, there would be absolutely none for the first thirty miles of the route—a very little after that. Marching on Alma from Eupatoria, the fleet, as on the last occasion, keeping along shore, could supply the whole army with water until their arrival at the river Bulganak, or Alma, where in the hottest summer months they would be sure to find some. The only great danger by which this movement would be attended would be the fearfully long flank which the allies must, necessarily leave exposed to the enemy in their march along the narrow road over the salt marshes, old and experienced officers consider this risk so great as to entirely counterbalance all the advantages, the allies might at first appear to possess by disembarking at Eupatoria. Landing at Kalamita Bay, south of the marshes, would avoid this danger; but then it would be absolutely necessary not only that the whole force should be disembarked at once, but that it should be an army of such strength as to enable it at its first landing to defy the utmost efforts of the Russians to compete with it. This army, therefore, ought at the very least to comprise 60,000 picked troops, and all the world must know now that to embark and disembark an army of 60,000 on an enemy's coast would require such an amount of preparation as to make it almost impossible that the expedition could be undertaken this year. Even if the whole plan could be arranged and carried out within the month, it would be madness to attempt it with the winter coming on, as the fleet, to be of any service at all, must lie on the open coast, with bad anchorage, and within a mile of a lee shore. . . . When the siege of the north side commenced, neither Balclava nor Kamiesch would have any importance, or be of any use but as store depôts. A new base of operations, and some new port from which to draw our supplies, would be necessary; the only one that could possibly be used is the Katcha. Do any of your readers recommend that our transport fleet should anchor for the winter off such a spot as that? Or do any of your readers suppose that during the rainy season supplies could be got over such a country as that which lies between the Katcha and the Belbek?"

"Expecting an advance against Simpheropol until the allies have ample means of land transport is out of the question, and a movement against Perekop about as likely and as feasible as a movement against the moon. Your readers may depend upon it that they will never hear of any fighting in the open field north of the Alma, and for the best of all reasons—viz., north of that part of the Crimea there are not sufficient roads, sufficient wood, or sufficient water, for the wants of an army, either English, French, or Russian."

A despatch dated Warsaw, Sept. 22, tells us that a new general recruitment in Russia is imminent. All the regular troops in Poland and Lithuania are marching on OJessa and Nicolaieff. Letters from St. Petersburg state that the army of reserve has been formed, and consist of 300,000 men.