

habitually insane at the time (*à l'époque*) the deed was passed.

The second question to be considered under art. 335 C. C., is as to whether the cause of Paquet's interdiction "notoriously existed" on the 8th of July.

What is meant by "notorious" in this connection, known in the French law as "*La notoriété*?"

I have already cited from Baudry-Lacantinerie, Aubry & Rau and Laurent, none of whom in precise terms, declare what general public knowledge is sufficient to satisfy the law on this question. (1)

In the case of *Brady vs Dubois*, (2) Chief Justice Lacoste, at page 414, observed:—"La notoriété dont il est question dans l'article 335 s'applique à la cause de l'interdiction, c'est-à-dire, qu'il faut qu'il soit *notoire* que la personne est dans un état *habituel de folie*, qui puisse justifier l'interdiction. Ce n'est pas sur quelques actes isolés que l'on déciderait qu'un homme a perdu la raison, mais lorsque la raison n'est plus qu'un accident chez lui (3) lorsque la folie est son état fréquent, le plus ordinaire."

Other authorities explaining this question. *Bouvier vs Collet*, (4) *Bédard vs Desy*, (5).

It would appear from these authorities that the cause for which Paquet was interdicted must have been publicly and generally known in Levis, where he resided, not in Quebec where the contract was made.

(1) See also F. H. Rep. Verbo Interdiction, vol. 24, nos 740, 747, 748, 751, 757, 759, 763.—2 Toullier no 1311.

(2) K. B., p. 407.

(3) 5 Laurent, 250.

(4) 31 J., 14.

(5) 16 K. B., 113.