be elected, then I want my vote transferred to Brown, who is my second choice. If Brown is also "out of it," and it comes down to a contest between Jones and Robinson, then I want my vote to count for Jones and against Robinson."

A description of the method of counting will show how the wishes of this voter and of every other voter are given effect to.

At the close of the poll the ballots are sorted out according to the "number one" votes for each candidate, no heed being paid to the other figures. If any candidate has then a clear majority of first-choice votes, he is elected, and the count goes no farther. But if there be no majority then the candidate who has the smallest number of these first-choice votes is declared "out of the count," and his ballots are distributed amongst the other three candidates in acordance with the second choices thereon—that is, each candidate gets the ballots on which his name is marked "2."

This may give some one a majority. If not, then the lowest of the three remaining candidates is excluded, as was the fourth, and his ballots are similarly transferred. When any ballot contains as second choice the name of the man already "out," his name is passed over, and the ballot goes to the third choice.

The effect of these operations is to concentrate all the votes upon the two remaining candidates; and whichever of them is found to have the greatest number of votes, transferred or original, is declared elected.

You will notice how the foregoing plan favors the full and free choice of the electors, by encouraging the nomination of more than two candidates. In the illustration above given, Smith's friends are not afraid to give him their first-choice votes, because they know that this will not injure the chances of any other candidate if Smith cannot be elected. They know that in that event their votes will go to a stronger candidate whom they have marked as next or next choice on their ballots. All fear of "vote splitting" being thus done away with, there would be nothing to prevent the nomination of half-a-dozen candidates, or even more. Instead of asking "Is he a strong candidate?" the main question would be "Will he make a good mayor?"

It is interesting to note that in the British colony of Queensland the law provides that a system similar to the foregoing may be used in Parliamentary elections when there are more than two candidates for the seat in a single-member district.

MEETING-ROOM ELECTIONS.

This "absolute majority" method will be found very useful in the elections of the officers of societies, clubs, lodges and similar social and business associations. In some of these organizations a rule already exists that each elected officer must have a clear majority; and several ballotings have sometimes to be taken in order to secure this result. The friends of the weaker candidate give up the man of their first choice and cast their votes for the one they like next best; and the process is continued until somebody gets a clear majority. But this plan is open to serious objection. It consumes much time, and tends to "log-rolling" and other undesirable things. The order of the voter's preference for the candidates ought to be decided at the time of the first balloting, not left to subsequent influences.

In many "meeting-room elections" blank ballots are used, on which the voter himself writes the candidates' names. In such cases the order of choice of the voter is indicated by the order in which he writes the names; the first name being his first choice, and so on. If after writing the names he desires to change the order of his choice, he may do so by using the figures 1, 2, 3, etc., as above; and the figures will govern.

The use of the Hare-Spence system in meeting-room elections affords an excellent test of its workableness, and is also of great value in making it more widely known. For "single officers," such as president and secretary, the method is as set forth above. For committees, some additional features are needed, which are described farther on.

ALDERMEN AND COUNCILLORS.

It is in the election of aldermen and councillors that the evil effects of a bad voting system have full scope. It is in this sphere of action that a good or bad arrangement of electoral districts, a good or bad method of marking ballots, a good or bad method of counting votes, chiefly determine the character of our municipal councils and consequently of our municipal government.

That the people of Ontario are beginning to realize this truth is shown by the popularity of recent legislation looking towards the abolition of municipal wards. The small electoral districts known as "wards" are emphatically a bad arrangement. They are doomed, and thus one great step is being taken towards good municipal government. What is the next step? Obviously, a change in the present voting system, if that system