

## Deciding for ourselves

states. The seminal doctrine of functional representation took as a goal and a given the existence of strong, comprehensive international organizations, which should have maximum effectiveness in meeting global human needs such as hunger and housing and which should not be tightly hierarchically organized into a pyramid with the great powers alone at the top. And the subsequent internationalist tradition of mediatory middle powermanship aimed above all at assisting European great and middle powers to complete the historical process of de-colonialization without widespread war.

There was, of course, a genuine danger that as the world changed, and a new American hegemony emerged, liberal-internationalism, with its benign concepts of commonality, consensus and compromise, and its lust for keeping international organizations functioning (and the Americans functioning within them) could become an intellectual justification for US dominance and Canadian acquiescence. Yet this danger was clearly identified by the early 1960s by Canadian scholars who feared that liberal-internationalist dogmas were primarily a soothing bromide for a Canada that was rapidly becoming a satellite of the United States. Thus was born the great "middlepower or satellite" debate that structures inquiry in the field of Canadian foreign policy to this day.

In order to help declare a winner, some scholars had by the 1970s begun to import the behavioral-quantitative revolution in American political science. With these disciplined empirical studies came the realist questions about foreign policy capabilities, objectives and patterns of international alignment. But while these questions may have been realist in inspiration, the answers were liberating in effect. For here came evidence that Canada had greater capability than traditionally assumed, objectives that were ambitious, distinctively Canadian, and divergent from American priorities in the world, and an association with the States that was open to considerable change.

### Canadian "neo-realism"

Equally expansive in its effects on scholarly thinking about Canadian foreign policy was the Canadian complex neo-realist revolution that began with a 1975 article by James Eayrs on "Canada's Emergence as a Foremost Power" (*International Perspectives*, May/June 1975). This vision of Canada emphasized the greater freedom and new opportunities Canada had in an increasingly non-American world. In many ways it was precisely the opposite response of that which neo-realist scholars of US foreign policy were providing. For in Canada there was almost no one to argue that declining US hegemony meant Canada should, in the interest of stability and order, become more closely supportive of the fast-fading but only hegemony still left.

## 2. SCHOLARS AND POLICYMAKERS

To what extent did these debates within the academy affect the premises and practices of those who actually produced Canadian foreign policy? The answers, like the influence relationships between scholars and policymakers, are subtle, complex and difficult to trace. They are even more elusive because, with rare exceptions,

there has been a harmonious relationship and easy interchange between the two groups, reflecting a basic underlying consensus about what Canadian foreign policy, and the world, should be. But to the extent that this integrated Canadian foreign policy community of intellectuals can be divided into the separate compartments of "town" and "gown," it has been the practising intellectuals in Ottawa, from Hume Wrong and Escott Reid through Lester Pearson and John Holmes to Klaus Goldschlag and Allan Gotlieb, who have been as much the teachers in the relationship as have the reflective individuals in the ivory towers across the land.

This intellectual partnership between scholars and policymakers was forged before the Second World War, when Professor Skelton's boys followed him into External Affairs to create the "University of the East Block." It intensified during the war when prominent professors went into External Affairs for the duration and in some cases stayed beyond. During the subsequent decade it was the External Affairs practitioners, led by Louis St. Laurent and Lester Pearson, who took the lead in educating Canadian journalists, and through them Canadian academics and publics, about the virtues of an internationalist foreign policy. The 1960s saw External's veterans of the golden age of Canadian diplomacy leave the Department for positions in the rapidly expanding Canadian university system, there to impart the wisdom of traditional liberal-internationalism to the first generation of Canadian-educated professors of Canadian foreign policy. The decade also saw the great academic revolt for a more "independent" foreign policy, and the successful government response in the public foreign policy review and revision of the 1968-1970 period.

### Citizen experts

During the past decade-and-a-half, the personal relationships of the past have been superseded by a variety of institutionalized mechanisms. But the policymakers still appear to have the upper hand. It is they who decide how many, if any, of the professors' intellectual progeny to induct as new foreign service officers, and what conceptual inventory these aspirants require to gain entry to the ranks. It is they who decide which professors to bring into the Department for a year or so, which to reward with consulting contracts and which to expose to public affairs audiences abroad. The academics can and do respond by feeding practitioners with policy commentary through media whose potent broadcast element is mandated by law to maximize Canadian content and driven by professional norms to give equal time to those critical of current government conduct. But apart from distant wars, the existing evidence suggests that those who make and maintain Canadian foreign policy receive their intellectual stimulus from a wide variety of sources, in which neither the media nor the academics have particular pride of place. And on the all-too-close subject of Canada-US relations, the twenty-five million Canadians with first hand experience of Americans, rather than the handful of the guest commentators on *The Journal* or *Canada AM*, are the experts who really count.

There are, of course, times when academics operating through the media can make a discernable difference. But rarely is the result a more realist or pro-American path. For

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Simon Alves