

I would add that, though aggression of all kinds and in all places should be met and condemned, we must face the fact that at the present time—and the lesson of Korea is very much in my mind when I say this—the free world may not possess the necessary strength to make that principle of collective action effective in every part of the world. Carried to an extreme degree, the theory of unlimited collective security everywhere might, because of the dissipation of strength its application would involve, mean no security anywhere. On the other hand, failure in any instance to defend collective security would deal a serious blow to the hopes of millions who have placed their trust in the United Nations.

This certainly involves us in a dilemma. Those of us who are charged with responsibility in these matters have therefore to exercise pretty careful judgment as to how on any given occasion this principle of collective security can best be put into effect without fatally weakening us for other and possibly more difficult tests. What is involved is essentially an ad hoc calculation of the political, strategic and moral factors which will be present in any particular issue.

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... I am sure the House would expect me to make a few general concluding observations on the situation as I see it, and what my own views are about the days immediately ahead. I think myself that there has been a little general improvement in the international situation in the last six months. I doubt, however, whether there has been any substantial easing of world tension in any respect. It is true I think that in the countries of Western Europe, which I had the privilege of visiting this summer, and where I discussed with those concerned with foreign affairs the possibilities and dangers that lie ahead, it is true in those countries morale is higher, and the persistent and pressing fears of an immediate armed aggression seem to have lessened somewhat. However, against this possible brightening of the picture in one area is the fact that in the Middle East, as I have tried to indicate, there are grave and growing dangers to stability and peace, and that in the Far East the aggressive forces of communist imperialism remain as militant and as defiant as ever. Even in Western Europe itself, the danger of military aggression is ever present, while economic and social difficulties remain a constant threat to stability, and one which the forces of Soviet imperialism are exploiting and will continue to exploit to the limit. Furthermore, if the strictly military picture has improved in the European area, that has been, I think, owing to the certain realization by any country which may now be tempted to break the peace that a group of free countries stand together in resistance to any such aggression, and that the ground on which they stand is becoming firmer. The moral to be drawn from this is therefore not that we should slacken our efforts, but that we should go ahead steadily and with determination to complete the job.

However, there are two types of aggression that we have to fear. There is military aggression, expressing itself in armed action, but there is social and economic aggression which expresses itself through the subversive activity of international communism. As to the first, military aggression, our military weakness—and in the face of Soviet land and air strength it is still a weakness—has been a standing temptation to Soviet attack. In strengthening ourselves, as we have done, and rightly so, to remove that temptation, we have, of course—and this I suppose applies particularly to the European countries—to be careful not to weaken ourselves unnecessarily in the economic and social field, and by doing so encourage the other kind of aggression. How to maintain this proper balance in the days ahead between military power, economic stability and social progress is probably the paramount problem of the free world today, and will only be solved by co-operative action which takes into account every factor, moral, social and economic, as well as military, that makes for strength.

It may well be that the Soviet Union, impressed by the action of the United Nations in Korea, and aware of the far greater residual strength of the West, will