

built up which could effectively handle large masses of artillery. <sup>47641</sup>

At the Somme in 1916, we had any quantity of guns and ammunition but many of our battery officers and higher commanders were inexperienced; our artillery intelligence organization was in its infancy; the methods of co-operation between aircraft and artillery command was rudimentary. Although, as Ludendorf admits, we did considerable harm to the Germans, the results indicated that there was not that happy combination in the employment of the artillery in support of the other arms which leads to easy success in battle. The lessons were invaluable but the cost in life was terrific.

It was largely because the British General Staff read these lessons correctly and had the courage of their convictions to effect the necessary reorganization that later we were able to beat the German despite the fact that in the technical matters of guns and ammunition they still maintained their lead.

Put shortly, the situation in 1917 and onward is, that the Germans had the advantage in quality of artillery material, we in quantity, organization and tactical employment.

General Byng, the Commander of the Canadian Corps, was one of the first to grasp the significance of the lessons of the Somme and, with Major General Sir Edward Morrison, set about perfecting our artillery organization. This attitude was maintained when Sir Arthur Currie succeeded General Byng in the command.